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When a company experiences financial distress, a control contest often
follows. Management fights to remain in control of the company, and shareholders, creditors and others try to influence management’s exercise of that control—or wrest it away. This is not a new phenomenon. The degree of influence
now exerted by corporate stakeholders in the distressed context, however, is strikingly different than in the past.
Headlines like the one above highlight that stakeholder control issues are
at the forefront of financially distressed situations large and small. The U.S.
government, as creditor, dictated the terms of Chrysler’s and General Motors’
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led financial institutions, giving those institutions little time or flexibility to
consider or reject the terms of the government’s offer. And the U.S. government
is not alone in using high-pressure tactics with distressed companies; stakeholders—particularly lenders and other significant creditors—employ such tactics
consistently and routinely.
This Article analyzes the intensified contest for control in corporate reorganizations and whether, as a result, existing bankruptcy laws adequately protect
the interests of all of a debtor’s stakeholders. Efforts by a stakeholder to influence control often lead to conflicts of interests and multiple, competing demands
on bankruptcy fiduciaries, i.e. debtors in possession and statutory committees.
In theory, these fiduciaries should shun their personal interests and any undue
influence by particular stakeholders. In practice, however, debtors and committees frequently are unable or unwilling to do so, and bankruptcy courts often do
not learn of conflicts, if at all, until it is too late. Accordingly, this Article
suggests the use of a third-party neutral to correct information asymmetry and
promote objectivity and fairness in the bankruptcy process.
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INTRODUCTION
The Washington Post reported: “President Obama’s harsh attack
on hedge funds [that] he blamed for forcing Chrysler into bankruptcy
yesterday sparked cries of protest from the secretive financial firms
that hold about $1 billion of the automaker’s debt.”2 The article was
discussing the status of restructuring negotiations among the U.S. government, banks holding seventy percent of the secured debt, hedge
funds holding a minority of the secured debt and Chrysler itself. The
automaker filed for bankruptcy and ultimately sold most of its assets
to the Italian automaker Fiat on terms negotiated by the U.S. and
Canadian governments, the United Auto Workers, certain lenders
and, to some extent, the company.3
The parties around the negotiating table in the corporate reorganization context certainly have changed. Traditionally, the distressed corporation, as a debtor in possession, sat at the head of the
table and controlled the tenor and much of the substance of the negotiations.4 The other parties included the corporation’s senior lenders
2 Steven Mufson & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, In Chrysler Saga, Hedge Funds Cast as
Prime Villain: Firms Say They Were Right to Hold Out, WASH. POST, May 1, 2009, at A14.
3 See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Chrysler Appears Set to Leave Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2009, at B1 (explaining litigation regarding and final approval of
Chrysler-Fiat transaction); Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Chrysler Deal with Fiat Hits Legal
Road Bump, WASH. POST, June 4, 2009, at A17 (explaining terms of Chrysler-Fiat transaction); see also Affidavit of Ronald E. Kolka in Support of First Day Pleadings at
26–38, In re Chrysler LLC, No. 09-50002-ajg (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009) (explaining restructuring negotiations leading to Chrysler-Fiat transaction).
4 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56
STAN. L. REV. 673, 675 (2003) (“Even in the cases most resembling the traditional
reorganization, creditor control is the dominant theme. Indeed, if the experience of
large businesses leaving Chapter 11 in 2002 is any guide, those at the helm do the
bidding of the creditors throughout the case.”); see also M. Todd Henderson, Paying
CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1543, 1558–64 (2007) (explaining creditor control opportunities in Chapter 11
and how that control affects the debtor’s conduct); George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 24–25 (2004) (explaining the shift in control of
restructurings to secured creditors and exploring the effects of that shift); Harvey R.
Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition—From Boom to Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 375, 387 (2007) (explaining the gradual marginalization of the debtor’s role in
Chapter 11 and noting that “[i]n 1978 Congress intended that the debtor-in-posses-
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and representatives of its unsecured creditors. These parties typically
were financial institutions and trade creditors who had an existing
business relationship with the corporation and a vested interest in the
continuation of the corporation as a going-concern.
Although the distressed corporation remains at the table, it no
longer automatically assumes the lead role in the negotiations, and it
frequently deals with strangers rather than familiar business partners.5
Financial institutions and trade creditors are increasingly quick to sell
their troubled credits.6 They often exit the credit before a corporation can design and implement a restructuring plan. The buyers of
this distressed debt include hedge funds, private equity firms, and
claims traders.7 These institutions focus on profit generation,
whether through the reorganization or liquidation of the corporation’s business, and generally achieve their goals by seizing control of
restructuring negotiations.8
sion would be the driving force of a chapter 11 reorganization”); James H.M. Sprayregen et al., Chapter 11: Not Perfect, but Better Than the Alternatives, 14 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.,
No. 6, 2005 at 3–5 (explaining perceived changes in Chapter 11 process and theories
supporting those changes). For a thoughtful analysis of the development of, and
changes in, secured creditor rights in the insolvency context, see Thomas E. Plank,
The Creditor in Possession Under the Bankruptcy Code: History, Text, and Policy, 59 MD. L.
REV. 253 (2000).
5 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 385 (“The chapter 11 process, as contemplated
in 1978, has been overwhelmed by marginalization of the debtor-in-possession, expansion of creditor (particularly secured creditor) control, the increasing imposition of
creditor designated chief restructuring officers (‘CROs’), claims trading, more complex debt and organizational structures, short-term profit motivation and, of course,
greed gratified by claims trading, acquisitions and litigation.”).
6 See Robert K. Rasmussen, Where Are All the Transnational Bankruptcies? The Puzzling Case for Universalism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 983, 1001 (2007) (observing that
“[t]hose creditors who want no part of bankruptcy have an exit option: they can sell
out to the various hedge funds that take a stake in many cases” and explaining debt
strategies of hedge funds and similar investors).
7 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 921, 939 n.43 (2007) (“For those who fret that bankers have a culture that makes
them overly cautious, one need only remember that many of today’s lenders are not
traditional banks. Private hedge funds are on the prowl for investments that promise
above market returns.”).
8 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Acceptance Remarks: Bankruptcy’s Undiscovered Country,
25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 7 (2008) (“The [new Chapter 11] process itself resembles
the takeover battles we see outside of bankruptcy. Corporate raiders square off
against each other in a bidding war, just as they would in a hostile takeover.”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1226–28 (2006) (explaining the shift in control
to creditors and illustrating effects of this shift through a case study of the Warnaco
Chapter 11 case); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance
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The goals of the corporation and its new set of creditors can and
often do conflict. In addition, intercreditor conflict can develop as
creditors compete for control of the corporation’s restructuring.9
Consequently, the corporation’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case can
become a battleground for resolving conflict rather than a neutral site
for building consensus. This conflict can impair corporate value and
potentially derail a corporation’s restructuring efforts.
This Article analyzes the increasing conflict in corporate reorganizations and whether the fiduciaries designated by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code—i.e., the debtor itself, referred to as a debtor in
possession (DIP), and statutory stakeholder committees—are
equipped to protect the corporation and its stakeholders generally. A
DIP assumes the role of a trustee under the Bankruptcy Code and is
charged with acting in the interests of the bankruptcy estate.10 Similarly, the DIP’s board of directors owes its fiduciary duties to the corporate entity.11 A statutory committee, on the other hand, owes
fiduciary duties to the particular class of creditors or shareholders represented by the committee. Statutory committees of unsecured creditors are common in Chapter 11 cases, and these committees owe their
fiduciary duties to the corporation’s general unsecured creditors.12
in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 931–33 (2003) (explaining ways that creditors
seek to assert control over Chapter 11 debtors).
9 See discussion infra Part III; see also Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the
Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 427–29 (2007) (discussing creditor conflicts created by hedging debt positions and other credit derivative practices, including empty plan voting).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006) (providing that “a debtor in possession shall
have all the rights . . . and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties . . .
of a trustee serving in a case under” Chapter 11); see also In re Cenargo Int’l, PLC, 294
B.R. 571, 599 n.32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“There is no question that a debtor in
possession is a fiduciary, like a chapter 11 trustee, for the estate, creditors and shareholders.” (citing CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985); In re Bidermann Indus.,
U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 551 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997))).
11 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers’ Fiduciary
Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J. CORP.
L. 491, 493, 509 nn.83–86 (2007) (“[W]hen the company enters bankruptcy and is
operating under Chapter 11, the cases hold or suggest that the obligation [of the
debtor’s management] is to maximize the total interests of creditors and shareholders
as a whole.”); A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate Reorganizations, 93
MINN. L. REV. 875, 878–86 (2009) (explaining the fiduciary duties of directors and
officers in and outside of insolvency); see also In re Count Liberty, LLC, 370 B.R. 259,
276 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007) (“When the debtor is a corporation, the debtor in possession’s fiduciary obligations to the corporation, its creditors and shareholders, fall
upon the officers and directors.”).
12 See, e.g., In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, 265 B.R. 427, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2001) (“Members of the committee also have another duty—a fiduciary duty to all

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-2\NDL201.txt

474

unknown

Seq: 6

notre dame law review

9-MAY-11

9:31

[vol. 86:2

DIPs and creditors’ committees are subject to self-interest and
influence by outside pressures. Board members and corporate management may aggressively pursue a reorganization of the business to,
among other things, preserve their jobs or attempt to salvage value for
shareholders.13 They may in turn cede to the demands of private
funds to obtain postpetition or exit financing for the corporation.14
Creditors’ committees may support a plan that allows one or more of
its members to obtain control of the reorganized corporation. Committee members also have access to and may use the corporation’s
confidential information to advance their own business agendas.15
The potential vulnerability of DIPs and creditors’ committees
raises the question of who is or should be protecting the bankruptcy
estate. The estate is formed upon the corporation’s Chapter 11 filing
and includes, among other things, all of the corporation’s legal and

creditors represented by the committee.” (citing In re Pierce, 237 B.R. 748, 758
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999); In re First RepublicBank Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1988))); In re Firstplus Fin., 254 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000) (“In a
Chapter 11 case, an Unsecured Creditors’ Committee is appointed by the Office of
the United States Trustee and owes a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of all unsecured
creditors.”).
13 See, e.g., Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate
Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 103 (1998) (“Protected from the normal contractual and market forces that restrain the behavior of
managers of healthy companies, managers of firms in bankruptcy, the harshest critics
charge, use delay and other strategies to enrich themselves and the shareholders at
the expense of the firm’s creditors.”).
14 See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV.
129, 170 (2005) (“Excessive creditor control remains undesirable because such influence may cause the debtor’s operations to be managed solely in the interests of the
particular controlling creditor group, thereby foreclosing the debtor’s restructuring
options.”).
15 See, e.g., Carl A. Eklund & Lynn W. Roberts, The Problem with Creditors’ Committees in Chapter 11: How to Manage the Inherent Conflicts Without Loss of Function, 5 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 129 (1997) (noting that a creditor’s “acceptance of an active
participatory role in a bankruptcy proceeding through service on a committee is most
likely motivated by each committee member’s interest in obtaining the maximum
possible return on its claim”); Mark J. Krudys, Insider Trading by Members of Creditors’
Committee—Actionable!, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 99, 124–27 (1994) (explaining conflict and
self-interest issues posed by committee members continuing to trade in the debtor’s
equity or debt); see also Kurt F. Gwynne, Intra-Committee Conflicts, Multiple Creditors’
Committees, Altering Committee Membership and Other Alternatives for Ensuring Adequate Representation Under Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 109,
120–26 (2006) (explaining potential conflicts for committee members, including
competing fiduciary duties).
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equitable interests in property.16 The estate represents the primary
source of recovery for the debtor’s stakeholders. Although the bankruptcy court and the U.S. trustee oversee Chapter 11 cases, they often
do not possess the information necessary to help the parties reach a
consensual or value-maximizing resolution to the case.
This Article suggests an alternative approach for preserving estate
value in the Chapter 11 context: a third-party neutral appointed by
the court to participate in the process. The Article refers to this neutral as a “case facilitator.”17 The case facilitator would introduce an
objective party into the restructuring process to facilitate (i) the flow
of information among all parties and (ii) the ultimate resolution of
the Chapter 11 case. This dual charge and the facilitative nature of
the role distinguish the case facilitator from a traditional Chapter 11
trustee or examiner.
The case facilitator would, among other things, work with the DIP
to gather information and explore restructuring alternatives; provide
information to the debtor’s stakeholders; act as a facilitator for negotiations among the debtor and its stakeholders; and report all relevant
information to the bankruptcy court and U.S. trustee. The role of the
case facilitator is crafted from elements of existing U.S. bankruptcy
laws, as well as concepts incorporated into Canadian, French and U.K.
insolvency laws.18 It also draws on basic principles of mediation and
other alternative dispute resolution techniques.19 The primary goals
of the case facilitator proposal are to correct information asymmetry
and reduce conflict (and related costs) in Chapter 11 cases, thereby
protecting and enhancing value for the benefit of all stakeholders.
Part I of this Article summarizes the nature and scope of the
problems associated with creditor control, conflicts and self-dealing in
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006) (explaining that the filing of a bankruptcy
petition creates an estate comprised of, among other things, “all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”).
17 The case facilitator would not displace the DIP and would not have standing to
file formal motions or litigation in the Chapter 11 case. See infra Part V (describing
the case facilitator proposal). Rather, the case facilitator would perform the functions
of a third-party neutral and serve primarily the court while assisting the debtor and its
stakeholders. For a general discussion of the need for neutrality in bankruptcy, see
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795,
825–27 (2004). See also Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An
Empirical Study of Investors’ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 74 n.23, 106–07
(2008) (discussing a concept similar to the case facilitator in context of empirical
study regarding distressed debt investors and referencing the “neutral manager” posited by Professor Westbrook (citing Westbrook, supra, at 825–27)).
18 See infra Part IV.
19 See infra Part V.
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Chapter 11. Part II places the problem in historical context by reviewing the development of U.S. bankruptcy laws and the traditional roles
of the DIP and statutory committee. Part III then analyzes the increasing conflict and stakeholder control in Chapter 11 cases. This analysis
leads to a discussion of the role of DIPs and statutory committees in
Chapter 11 and the tools available to them and others to combat
potential abuses of the process. Part IV explores alternatives to a U.S.style corporate reorganization, focusing on Canadian, French, and
U.K. insolvency laws. This comparative discussion lays the foundation
for the case facilitator proposal.
Part V sets forth the basic elements of the case facilitator proposal. This Part explains the duties of the case facilitator, the mediation
components of the proposal and how the concept could be integrated
into existing U.S. bankruptcy laws. It also addresses potential concerns with the proposal and suggests ways the case facilitator could
streamline the process and reduce administrative costs. This Article
concludes by encouraging policymakers to adopt the case facilitator
proposal as a way to level the playing field in Chapter 11 and provide
the often under-represented bankruptcy estate and stakeholders a
voice in the Chapter 11 process.
I. THE NATURE

AND

SCOPE

OF THE

PROBLEM

The primary goals of Chapter 11 are to rehabilitate corporate
debtors and maximize recoveries to creditors.20 The Bankruptcy
Code also generally seeks to level the playing field among a debtor’s
stakeholders, thereby providing a more equitable distribution.21
Achieving one or more of the Bankruptcy Code’s objectives is difficult
in any individual or business bankruptcy case. That task is even more
20 See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991) (discussing two traditional goals of Chapter 11); In re Aurora Cord & Cable Co., 2 B.R. 342, 346 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1980) (“The essence of Chapter 11, however, is to prevent the unnecessary
dismemberment of viable corporations and to provide a maximum distribution to
creditors who would be likely to receive nothing in the event of liquidation.”); H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1978); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 10 (1978); see also United States
v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (“By permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy creditors’
claims, and to produce a return for its owners. Congress presumed that the assets of
the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for
scrap.’ ” (citation omitted)); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect
World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 419 (1993) (discussing traditional goals of Chapter 11).
21 For example, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the DIP to challenge and avoid
certain pre-petition transfers to creditors made within the ninety days before the filing of the Chapter 11 case (or one year for transfers to insiders) or made with actual
or constructive intent to defraud creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548.
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onerous in a Chapter 11 case because the corporate debtor and its
various stakeholders often have their own, competing agendas.22
Creditors are not benevolent by nature. Rather, they endeavor to
maximize their individual returns.23 If other creditors also benefit,
that result typically is inadvertent and of secondary concern. Accordingly, as in In re Foamex International, Inc.24 case, a creditor may seek
appointment to a statutory committee and then resign upon having its
contract assumed and performed by the debtor.25 Likewise, as in the
In re Galey & Lord26 case, a creditor may use confidential information
obtained by serving on a statutory committee to enhance its own trading in the debtor’s securities;27 or as in the In re Kmart Corp.28 case, a
creditor may use its position on a committee to gain ownership control of the reorganized company.29 Counsel to the statutory committee may either ignore or facilitate a member’s self-interested conduct
22 See infra Part III.
23 See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV.
1609, 1662 (2009) (“In the old days, people wanted to see two things: to get paid and
to see the company survive. Today, people only want one thing: to get paid.” (quoting Interview by Jonathan C. Lipson with Private Investigator No. 3 (July 14, 2009)));
Westbrook, supra note 17, at 844 (describing incentive problems inherent in creditor
control: “creditor control risks realization of substantially less than the full value of
the asset being sold”); see also Jamie Mason, Every Man for Himself, DEAL, Mar. 20, 2009,
http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/features/every-man-for-himself.php (“Bankruptcies are negotiating bazaars. There are many constituencies—the debtor, lenders, creditors of all kinds, potential acquirers. . . . It’s often a scrum, with every man
and woman for themselves.”).
24 368 B.R. 383 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
25 In Foamex International, Shell Chemical resigned from the creditors’ committee
after the debtor assumed its executory contract. See Order Pursuant to Section 365(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code Authorizing Foamex L.P. to Assume an Executory Contract,
as Amended, with Shell Chemical LP, In re Foamex Int’l, Inc., 368 B.R. 383 (No. 0512685-PJW); Amended Notice of Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors,
In re Foamex Int’l, Inc., 368 B.R. 383 (No. 05-12685-PJW) (noting that it was
“[a]mended to reflect resignation of Shell Chemical from the Committee as of
December 1, 2006”).
26 Ch. 7 Case No. 04-43098 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2004).
27 David Wighton, $10.9m Settles Insider Trading Case, FIN. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at
24 (describing the allegations against Barclays Capital regarding trading in Galey &
Lord securities based on inside information).
28 No. 02-02474 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2003).
29 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corp. & Its Affiliated Debtors & Debtors-in-Possession at 74, In re Kmart,
No. 02-02474; see also Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy
Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 725–27 (2008)
(discussing ESL Investment’s use of committee position to propose plan under which
it acquired control of reorganized company).
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because of loyalty to the member who secured or supported counsel’s
retention.30
Moreover, the activity of hedge funds and private equity firms in
distressed debt complicates the problem. Similar to Goldman Sachs’
investment strategy with AIG, these creditors can use derivatives,
short-selling, empty voting and similar investment strategies to mitigate their economic exposure while making a control play for the
debtor.31 As observed in the WorldCom32 case:
Because the long position in one proprietary account was offset by a
short position in another proprietary account, Blue River had only a
$6.5 million face value claim against WorldCom. Had the U.S. Trustee known that Blue River’s claim was $6.5 million and not $400
million, it is unlikely that Blue River would have been appointed to
WorldCom’s creditors’ committee.33

Finally, management bias and alliance with friendly creditors can disadvantage others in the process.34
Self-dealing and control contests in corporate restructurings are
becoming commonplace.35 As a result, conflicts and costly disputes
are on the rise, and the problems associated with information asymmetry are intensifying.36 The current Chapter 11 process does not
facilitate adequate monitoring of these disputes or provide a resolution mechanism, short of litigation before the bankruptcy court or
30 See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Bankrupt, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2005), http://www.forbes.
com/forbes/2005/1031/060.html (describing Chapter 11 examiner’s criticism of
committee counsel’s role in creditors’ disputes in the FiberMark case).
31 See Daniel Gross, The Rise of the ‘Empty Creditor’, SLATE (Apr. 21, 2009, 3:01 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2216604 (“Goldman didn’t care that it would wipe out its
AIG arrangements, because it had already hedged its exposure to AIG—through contracts, credit-default swaps, or other derivatives.”); see also Lipson, supra note 23, at
1648–49 (discussing emerging issues with empty voting and similar creditor strategies
in Chapter 11).
32 Van D. Greenfield, Exchange Act Release No. 52,744 (Nov. 7, 2005) (remedial
sanctions and cease-and-desist order), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/34-52744.pdf.
33 Id. at 8.
34 See, e.g., In re Exide Techs., 303 B.R. 48, 60 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (endorsing,
in a valuation dispute between debtor and committee, committee’s assertion that
“plans providing management and/or senior creditors with the majority of stock or
options in the reorganized company (as in the Debtor’s Plan) is a strong indicator
that the company is being undervalued, resulting in a windfall for management and
the senior creditors”); see also infra Part III.B (discussing debtor-committee conflict).
35 See infra Part III.
36 See also Lipson, supra note 23, at 1624 (“[T]here are important gaps between
the informational architecture of the Bankruptcy Code and the federal securities laws.
Shadow bankruptcy exploits these gaps.”).
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displacement of the corporate debtor, to solve them.37 The case
facilitator proposal seeks to strengthen these aspects of the Chapter
11 process and promote greater efficiency in corporate restructurings.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT

OF

U.S. CORPORATE REORGANIZATION LAWS

Early U.S. bankruptcy law did not address corporate reorganization.38 The laws primarily focused on merchants and “straight” bankruptcy (i.e., liquidation). Troubled corporations thus were left to
their own devices, negotiating workouts with their major creditors in a
largely unsupervised forum. The Great Depression of the 1930s produced the first federal bankruptcy laws covering corporate reorganizations, and aspects of those laws continue under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. An understanding of the law’s development is helpful in analyzing control contests and conflicts in bankruptcy and the role that
DIPs and statutory committees do or should play.39
A. Equity Receiverships and Protective Committees
In the late nineteenth century, creative lawyers and federal judges
crafted a procedure to fill a void in U.S. bankruptcy laws and address
the financial distress of the country’s railroads. The procedure, commonly referred to as an equity receivership, allowed a troubled railroad— with the assistance of its major creditors—to invoke the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to achieve a restructuring of its
debt.40 Technically, the railroad’s creditors would petition the court
37 See infra Parts II.B.3, III.C, V.E.
38 The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “pass uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcy.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Congress made three early
attempts at federal bankruptcy legislation before achieving long-term legislation
under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. These early attempts—the 1800 Act, the 1841 Act,
and the 1867 Act—first targeted merchant involuntary bankruptcies, but then
included voluntary and involuntary bankruptcies for all parties other than corporations. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 14–19 (1995). The 1867 Act eventually permitted corporations to act as debtors and introduced the concept of composition (i.e., debt repayment plans) as an alternative to liquidation. Id. at 19–20.
39 The history of U.S. bankruptcy law has been explored in depth in several excellent sources. See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION (2001); CHARLES WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935); Tabb, supra note 38. Accordingly, this
Article only highlights developments relevant to the balance of power between fiduciaries and beneficiaries in Chapter 11.
40 See SKEEL, supra note 39, at 56–60 (explaining development of equity receiverships); Tabb, supra note 38, at 21–23 (same); see also Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 747–49 (1991)
(describing development and use of equity receiverships); Bruce A. Markell, Owners,
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to appoint a receiver and the receiver would take title to the railroad’s
assets.41 The receiver’s primary task was to find a buyer for the assets
and to continue the railroad’s operations until the time of the sale.
Although the basic description of an equity receivership leaves
the impression that the railroad, its management and its creditors
turned over control of the restructuring to a receiver, that result did
not occur in most cases. Rather, management typically encouraged
friendly creditors to petition for the appointment of a receiver, and
then management and those creditors would negotiate a restructuring
plan.42 Those creditors were sometimes referred to as a protective
committee or a reorganization committee. Those creditors also were
frequently the only (and therefore successful) bidders at the sale of
the railroad’s assets.43 Consequently, in most cases, the receiver
played an insignificant role.
Other troubled corporations soon adopted equity receivership
procedures similar to those invoked by the railroads.44 The process
not only provided a structured forum in which corporations could
reorganize, but it also facilitated a quick restructuring with little interference from outsiders, such as the court, the receiver, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).45 Corporate management
thus frequently favored the process.
The insular nature of equity receiverships, however, lent the process to abuse and generated substantial criticism. The most notable
critic was William O. Douglas. As discussed below, Justice Douglas
launched his campaign against equity receiverships after the process
Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 74–77
(1991) (describing the development of the absolute priority rule with respect to
railroads).
41 See Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors’ Committees,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1547, 1553–55 (1996) (explaining general process followed in
equity receiverships).
42 See Tabb, supra note 38, at 22 (“In form, the receivership resulted in the sale of
the debtor’s assets, with the proceeds distributed to creditors. In substance, however,
the entire elaborate proceeding often resulted in old management retaining control
of the enterprise, and dictating the terms of the sale.”).
43 See SKEEL, supra note 39, at 59 (“Counsel who have acted frequently for reorganization committees have spent a great many anxious hours preparing for the
unexpected bidder, but in my own experience he has never appeared . . . . Manifestly
in most sales where the security holders . . . have . . . placed their interest in the hands
of a committee there is not likely to be serious competition at the sale.” (quoting Paul
Cravath, a lawyer who represented committees in equity receivership cases)).
44 See id. at 57–60 (explaining application of equity receiverships to general businesses); Tabb, supra note 38, at 21–23 (same).
45 See Tabb, supra note 38, at 22 (“In practice, the equity receivership came to be
dominated by insiders, and was subject to much abuse.”).
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was codified by Congress in 1934.46 He asserted that management
and those creditors aligned with management controlled most aspects
of the equity receivership process, providing no representation for,
and frequently small returns to, other creditors.47 In fact, creditors
not participating in the reorganization committee’s plan could be
cashed out for a fraction of their debt holdings.48
Justice Douglas also lamented the role of protective committees
in the process. He complained that the committees often were selfselected and influenced, if not controlled, by management and the
corporation’s investment bankers.49 Although he acknowledged the
useful role that committees could play in reorganizations, he cited
conflicts and other circumstances that, in his opinion, caused committee members to breach their fiduciary duties. He stated, “In the welter of conflicting interests, ulterior objectives and self-serving actions
which flow from investment banker-management dominance over
committees, these committees have frequently lost sight of their essential functions which they can perform to advance the interests of investors.”50 As discussed in Part III, several of Justice Douglas’ criticisms
might apply to the existing Chapter 11 process.
B. Federal Corporate Reorganization Law
Equity receivership was the preferred means of corporate reorganization well into the 1930s. Congress even adopted key features of
equity receiverships in the first U.S. corporate reorganization laws,

46 See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1556–57 (explaining the abuse of equity receiverships and Justice Douglas’s criticism of the process).
47 Justice Douglas conducted a study of equity receiverships during his tenure
with the SEC. See SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES
(1937) [hereinafter SEC REPORT].
48 See SKEEL, supra note 39, at 60 (noting that creditors who did not support the
proposed reorganization plan were entitled to receive their pro rata share of the
“upset price,” which typically was set at ten to eighty percent below the market value
of the debt).
49 See SEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 315–16 (recommending that “measures be
taken to free committees operating in that field from material conflicts of interest”).
50 To Amend the Securities Act of 1933: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong. 24 (1937) (statement of William O. Douglas, Comm’r,
SEC).
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enacted in 1934 as section 77B of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.51 Congress enacted section 77B in response to the Great Depression.52
Under section 77B, management and a protective committee
could still formulate the plan of reorganization and force dissenting
creditors to accept the plan. They no longer had to implement the
plan, however, under the guise of a receiver sale. Section 77B
required only that the court determine that the plan “‘was fair and
equitable,’ did not ‘discriminate unfairly,’ and ‘was feasible.’”53 Consequently, the process remained subject to abuse and manipulation by
management and key creditors.
The codification of equity receiverships generated substantial
criticism from the SEC and others.54 The result was a substantial overhaul of corporate reorganization laws, culminating in the Chandler
Act of 1938.55 What equity receiverships and section 77B gave management and key creditors’ groups, the Chandler Act essentially took
away, at least with respect to public corporations.
1. The Chandler Act
The Chandler Act of 193856 established two business reorganization options—Chapter X for public companies and Chapter XI for
51 See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1555–56 (noting that section 77B was “aptly
described as the old equity receivership reorganization pressed upon a bankruptcy
mold, with additions” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
52 See, e.g., Barlow v. Budge, 127 F.2d 440, 443 (8th Cir. 1942) (“The unfavorable
business conditions which prevailed during the 1930s are a matter of common knowledge. Businessmen were urged to continue operations in the face of adverse conditions, to prevent further unemployment and in the hope that their businesses might
survive. Legislation, both state and national, was enacted to prevent individuals and
corporations from going to the wall.”). Notably, Congress adopted similar reorganization provisions for railroads in 1933 under section 77 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. See
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 77, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978); SKEEL, supra note
39, at 54, 106. For a judicial account of the development of the railroad provisions,
see Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648,
670–75 (1935).
53 See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1556 (describing key elements of section 77B).
54 See SEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 84 (“[77B] preserved and, in some cases,
even accentuated certain defects in the earlier procedures.”); see also SKEEL, supra
note 39, at 101–13 (detailing Justice Douglas’ involvement in the campaign to reform
section 77B and his role in the SEC Report); Tabb, supra note 38, at 28 (explaining
the role of various bankruptcy studies and reports, in addition to the SEC Report, in
the passage of the Chandler Act).
55 See Tabb, supra note 38, at 29.
56 Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
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small businesses.57 Chapter X stood in stark contrast to equity receiverships and section 77B. For example, it mandated the appointment
of an independent bankruptcy trustee, SEC involvement in the plan
process and significantly increased court involvement in the solicitation of votes on, and approval of, the plan of reorganization.58 Chapter XI, on the other hand, left most of the plan process to the
discretion of the debtor and its unsecured creditors, with little involvement from the court and no requirement for trustee or SEC
participation.59
Both Chapters X and XI contemplated creditors’ committees, but
they prescribed very different roles for those committees. Under
Chapter X, creditors could still form protective committees.60 These
committees were limited, however, to providing information to the
represented creditors and had no official standing in the bankruptcy
case. Creditors’ committees in Chapter XI did have standing and
were elected at a meeting of creditors early in the case.61 In fact, the
Chapter XI creditors’ committee was the primary party overseeing the
debtor’s conduct and negotiation of the plan.
Not surprisingly, public corporations resisted filings under Chapter X. Managers and large creditors disliked the loss of control and
corresponding uncertainty.62 Consequently, many corporations first
tried to qualify for Chapter XI or negotiate a restructuring outside of
the formal process.63 They viewed Chapter X as a last resort. Nevertheless, it remained the primary reorganization option for public corporations for the next thirty years.
57 For a judicial account of the development of the Chandler Act of 1938, see
SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 603–07 (1965).
58 See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1557–58 (explaining key elements of Chapter X).
59 See id. (explaining key elements of Chapter XI); see also Dickerson, supra note
11, at 888–89 (describing treatment of debtors and their management under Chapter
X versus Chapter XI).
60 See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1558 (explaining roles of committees under Chapter X and Chapter XI).
61 See id.
62 See SKEEL, supra note 39, at 123–27 (explaining the general negative corporate
reaction to Chapter X and noting that “[t]he independent trustee requirement discouraged the managers of large firms from filing for bankruptcy if there was any way
to avoid it”).
63 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1300 (2006)); see id. at 125–27; see also Dickerson, supra
note 11, at 890 (“The harsh treatment managers received in Chapter X discouraged
managers from using that Chapter and ultimately caused Chapter XI to become the
dominant reorganization vehicle for even large, publicly-traded companies that ostensibly should have filed under the trustee-controlled Chapter X.”).
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2. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
A sharp rise in consumer bankruptcy in the 1960s energized
bankruptcy reform efforts that produced the Bankruptcy Code of
1978.64 Corporate reorganization received substantial attention in the
reform process as well. The Bankruptcy Code consolidated the business reorganization chapters into one chapter (i.e., Chapter 11) and
eliminated what corporations found most offensive about Chapter X:
the mandatory trustee and SEC participation.65
Notably, the two key proposals set forth during the bankruptcy
reform process did not directly recommend the elimination of trustees and the SEC’s involvement in the plan process.66 For example,
the proposal by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission contemplated a presumption in favor of a trustee in large cases and the
appointment of a bankruptcy administrator to perform the tasks
assigned to the SEC under Chapter X.67 Similarly, the proposal by the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges maintained the role of the
trustee and SEC in public corporation cases.68 The bankruptcy bar
was, however, a strong proponent of a presumption that a trustee
would not be appointed, leaving a corporation’s restructuring in management’s hands.69
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code adopted much of the flexibility built into Chapter XI.70 Debtors (as DIPs) remain in possession of
their assets and can operate their businesses and pursue their restructurings with oversight primarily from a creditors’ committee. The
Bankruptcy Code also created the U.S. trustee program, which serves
some of the administrative functions assigned to the SEC under Chap-

64 See SKEEL, supra note 39, at 136–41 (explaining events leading to enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code); Tabb, supra note 38, at 31–37 (same).
65 See Tabb, supra note 38, at 35 (“Another notable feature of the 1978 law was
the merger of the reorganization chapters into a single chapter.”).
66 See SKEEL, supra note 39, at 176–77 (explaining general proposals of the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission and the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges and noting that “[c]riticism by the bankruptcy bar and bench was muted at
times, and the early hearings even included a few notes of support for the existing
regime”).
67 See id. at 177 (“Similarly, there was broad support for the Bankruptcy Commission’s proposal to soften the requirement that trustees be appointed in large cases, by
making the trustee presumptive, rather than mandatory.”).
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1559 (explaining key elements of Chapter 11).
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ter X.71 The U.S. trustee oversees both individual and business bankruptcies and rarely plays a substantive oversight role in any particular
case. In addition, Chapter 11 permits the appointment of a trustee or
examiner under certain circumstances.
Overall, the Bankruptcy Code was largely viewed as prodebtor
legislation at the time of its enactment. In early Chapter 11 cases,
courts granted the debtor’s management lengthy periods of exclusivity in which only the debtor could propose a plan of reorganization;
allowed the debtor to defer decisions on the treatment of most all
contracts and leases until plan confirmation; and enjoined most all
actions against the debtor and sometimes its directors, officers and
nondebtor affiliates.72 The debtor’s control of the process has weakened, however, as creditors have become more sophisticated, lobbied
for favorable legislative amendments and created control
opportunities.73
3. Bankruptcy Fiduciaries
As discussed above, Chapter 11 allows a DIP and its management
to lead the debtor’s restructuring efforts and contemplates the
appointment of a statutory committee to oversee those efforts. Sec71 See Tabb, supra note 38, at 35 (explaining that Congress rejected the Commission’s proposal for a “Bankruptcy Administrator,” but adopted “a pilot program utilizing ‘United States trustees’ as administrative officers”).
72 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 387 (noting that Congress enacted certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to induce reluctant debtors to file Chapter 11 cases,
including: “administrative provisions that provided protections for the debtor, including the automatic stay; the ability to use, sell or lease property, including the cash
collateral and other collateral security of a secured creditor; the ability to assume or
reject executory contracts and unexpired leases of non-residential real property; and,
importantly, the ability to obtain credit and offer to lenders material enhancements
for lending to a debtor-in-possession”). For example, prior to the 2005 amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code, courts generally were very liberal in granting extensions of
the debtor’s exclusive period to file and solicit acceptances of a plan of reorganization. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., No. 89-10448 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12,
1999) (extending the debtor’s exclusive period for approximately six years). The
2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code place a firm expiration on the debtor’s
exclusive periods—i.e., eighteen months for its exclusive period to file a plan and
twenty months for its exclusive period to solicit acceptance of the plan. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121(d) (2006).
73 See, e.g., Kuney, supra note 4, at 24–25 (explaining creditor influence over
bankruptcy legislation); Miller, supra note 4, at 387 (“Using that piece of special interest legislation [referring to section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code] as a foundation,
other creditor groups pressed Congress for legislative containment of the bankruptcy
court and the debtor-in-possession’s powers. Congress has been generous in responding to the ‘needs’ of these special interest groups.”).
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tions 1101 and 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code facilitate the DIP’s role
by recognizing the existence of a DIP and granting it “all the rights . . .
and powers, and [authority to perform] all the functions and duties
. . . of a trustee serving in a case under” Chapter 11.74 Section 1102 in
turn provides that, in all but a few excluded cases, “the United States
trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors or . . . of equity security
holders as the United States trustee deems appropriate.”75 The committee’s duties are listed in § 1103 and include consulting with the
DIP; investigating the DIP’s prepetition and postpetition conduct and
affairs; and participating in the plan process.76
The Bankruptcy Code itself does not use the term “fiduciary” or
expressly designate either the DIP or the committee as a fiduciary.77
Nevertheless, case law recognizes the fiduciary nature of both statutory representatives. Specifically, courts treat the DIP as a fiduciary
for the bankruptcy estate, and the committee as a fiduciary for those
it represents.78 Courts also have suggested in certain circumstances
74 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); see also id. § 1101(1) (defining “debtor in possession”).
75 Id. § 1102(a)(1); see also id. § 1102(b)(1) (“[A creditors’ committee] shall ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims against
the debtor of the kinds represented on such committee . . . .”).
76 See id. § 1103 (describing duties of statutory committees); see also Greg M.
Zipes & Lisa L. Lambert, Creditors’ Committee Formation Dynamics: Issues in the Real
World, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229, 231 (2003) (“Congress specifically allowed committees
to ‘consult with the trustee or debtor concerning the administration of the case,’ to
evaluate the debtor’s financial dealings and current financial condition so the committee can evaluate the case’s viability and the prospects for a plan, to negotiate plan
terms, and to seek the appointment of a trustee or examiner.” (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 1103(c)(1))).
77 See, e.g., In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 246 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Section
1103(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which grants to the Committee broad authority to
formulate a plan and perform ‘such other services as are in the interest of those represented,’ has been interpreted to imply both a fiduciary duty to committee constituents and a limited grant of immunity to committee members.” (quoting 11 U.S.C.
1103(c))); In re Envirodyne Indus., 174 B.R. 955, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (“Both
trustees and official committees are the creation of the Code and their duties are
governed under the Code. In addition, both trustees and members of official committees owe fiduciary duties to their respective constituencies.” (citation omitted)).
78 With respect to DIPs, see, for example, Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985), which noted that “if a debtor remains in possession—that is, if a trustee is not appointed—the debtor’s directors bear essentially the
same fiduciary obligation to creditors and shareholders as would the trustee for a
debtor out of possession”; Biltmore Associates, LLC v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co., 572
F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2009), which stated that “the debtor in possession of the bankruptcy estate [is] empowered to act as a trustee and required to act as a fiduciary for
its creditors and shareholders”; In re Insilco Technologies, Inc., 480 F.3d 212, 215 n.3 (3d
Cir. 2007), which noted that [w]hen acting as debtor in possession, the debtor is
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that the committee’s efforts must generally benefit the bankruptcy
estate.79
A fiduciary relationship traditionally exists where “one party to a
fiduciary relation (the entrustor) is dependent on the other (the fiduciary).”80 The role envisioned for the DIP and the committee under the
Bankruptcy Code certainly satisfies this basic definition. The debtor’s
stakeholders—i.e., parties with economic interests in the bankruptcy
estate—rely on the DIP to propose and confirm a plan that maximizes
bound by all of the fiduciary duties of a bankruptcy trustee”; In re Cenargo International, PLC, 294 B.R. 571, 599 n.32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003), which stated that “[t]here
is no question that a debtor in possession is a fiduciary, like a chapter 11 trustee, for
the estate, creditors and shareholders.” With respect to committees, see, for example,
Jacobson v. AEG Capital Corp., 50 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), which stated that
“[a] committee has a fiduciary responsibility to represent the best interests of their
constituency”; Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 327 B.R. 561, 573
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005), noting general fiduciary duty of creditors’ committees and
explaining “the existence of a fiduciary relationship among the committee members
as they are serving each other as well as the unsecured creditors not selected as members of the committee”; In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 265 B.R. 427, 432
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001), which stated that “[m]embers of the committee also have
another duty—a fiduciary duty to all creditors represented by the committee”; and In
re Firstplus Financial, Inc., 254 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000), which stated that
“[i]n a Chapter 11 case, an Unsecured Creditors’ Committee is appointed by the
Office of the United States Trustee and owes a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of all
unsecured creditors.” See also C.R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the DIP’s
Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditors’ Lawyer in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 53–54 (1997) (explaining fiduciary duties of the DIP).
79 Cases suggesting that a statutory committee has some duty to the bankruptcy
estate generally arise in the context of court approval of the committee’s professional’s fees or professional compensation for other parties in interest. See, e.g., Mfrs.
Hanover Trust Co. v. Bartsh (In re Flight Transp. Corp. Secs. Litig.), 874 F.2d 576, 581
(8th Cir. 1989) (ruling on a request for payment of an indenture trustee’s professional fees and observing that “unlike the trustee, the debtor-in-possession and the
official creditors’ committee, which are entities with fiduciary obligations to the bankruptcy estate, an indenture trustee owes its fiduciary duty to the debenture holders,
not the bankruptcy estate”). But see Official, Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern
(In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305, 1315 (1st Cir. 1993) (“While a creditors’ committee and its members must act in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and with proper regard for the bankruptcy court, the committee is a fiduciary
for those whom it represents, not for the debtor or the estate generally.”).
80 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983); see also ERNEST
VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS 1 (3d ed. 1955) (explaining nature of fiduciary relationship); Robert
Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1991) (noting different theories of
fiduciary duties and observing that “[i]n any of these paradigmatic forms, a beneficiary entrusts a fiduciary with control and management of an asset”).
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the estate’s value. Likewise, creditors or equity holders represented by
a committee expect the committee to act in their best interests.81
A fiduciary owes certain duties to its beneficiaries, including the
utmost duty of good faith and loyalty.82 In the bankruptcy context,
these duties generally require the DIP’s management and the committee’s members to put aside their self-interest and make decisions
based on the collective best interests of their beneficiaries.83 Identifying the restructuring course that best serves a particular beneficiary
class can be challenging in and of itself. The DIP’s and committee’s
task is even more onerous when the individual interests of management, committee members or outside parties infiltrate the decisionmaking process.84
81 Unlike the beneficiaries of traditional fiduciary relationships, these stakeholders are not solely dependent on the DIP and the committee. A debtor’s creditors,
equity holders and other parties in interest have standing to appear and be heard on
most any issue raised in the Chapter 11 case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). Nevertheless,
not every stakeholder gets a seat at the negotiating table, and thus their practical
ability to protect their own interests is limited by the process itself.
82 See, e.g., Lange v. Schropp (In re Brook Valley VII, Joint Venture), 496 F.3d 892,
900 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that, in the bankruptcy context, “[t]he fiduciary obligation consists of two duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty”); Ad Hoc
Comm. of Equity Holders of Tectonic Network, Inc. v. Wolford, 554 F. Supp. 2d 538,
558 n.135 (D. Del. 2008) (explaining the duty of good faith as a subset of the duty of
loyalty in the bankruptcy context).
83 See, e.g., In re Brook Valley, 496 F.3d at 900–01 (“The duty of loyalty comes into
play when there appears to be a conflict between the interests of the fiduciary and the
entity to which he owes loyalty. For a debtor in possession, this duty ‘includes an
obligation to refrain from self-dealing, to avoid conflicts of interests and the appearance of impropriety, to treat all parties to the case fairly and to maximize the value of
the estate.’ ” (quoting 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1107.02(4) (Lawrence P. King ed.,
15th rev. ed. 2006))); Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d
233, 256 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A committee member violates its fiduciary duty by pursuing
a course of action that furthers its self-interest to the potential detriment of fellow
committee members.”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Apex Global Info.
Servs., Inc. v. Qwest Commc’ns Corp., 405 B.R. 234, 252 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009)
(“[I]t is evident that participation on the unsecured committee is accompanied and
undergirded with fiduciary responsibilities which obligate members to ‘act with undivided loyalty for the benefit of all of the unsecured creditors.’ ” (quoting In re ABC
Auto. Prods. Corp., 210 B.R. 437, 441 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997))); In re First RepublicBank Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998) (“A conflict of interest that
amounts to a breach of that fiduciary duty constitutes the type of conflict that would
mandate removal of the creditor from the committee.”).
84 See, e.g., In re Brook Valley, 496 F.3d 892 (affirming lower court’s decision holding that debtor’s partners breached fiduciary duty of loyalty by consenting to foreclosure sale of debtor’s assets and then bidding on assets at sale); Citicorp Venture
Capital, Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 323 F.3d 228, 234–36
(3d Cir. 2003) (affirming lower court’s decision subordinating claims of insider/
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Self-interest and conflict are potential hazards in any fiduciary
relationship. The multiple interests, flexibility in valuation, and overall exigency of the situation intensify these hazards in the bankruptcy
context.85 As in other fiduciary relationships, identifying these
director of debtor for breaching fiduciary duty by, among other things, purchasing
claims against debtor at a discount price, withdrawing support for debtor’s original
bankruptcy plan and pursuing competing plan); In re Nutritional Sourcing Corp., 398
B.R. 816, 835 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (denying plan confirmation where creditors’
committee negotiated and approved settlement detrimental to a certain class of
unsecured creditors not specifically represented by a committee member); Official
Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders of Aldelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Aldelphia Commc’ns
Corp. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 371 B.R. 660, 673 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(affirming lower court’s withdrawal of equity committee’s derivative standing because
“the Equity Committee is so far out of the money, it would have an inherent conflict
of interest in controlling any litigation against the banks”), aff’d, 544 F.3d 420 (2d Cir.
2008); In re Count Liberty, LLC, 370 B.R. 259, 277 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding
debtor, through the conduct of its president, in contempt of cash collateral order, as
evidence showed misappropriation of estate funds); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.,
336 B.R. 610, 670–73 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (observing that “[d]ebtors also have the
duty to avoid conflicts of interest and the appearance of impropriety, and to treat all
parties to the case fairly” and, accordingly, granting ad hoc committee’s motion to
require recusal of debtors from litigation and negotiations among creditors regarding
interdebtor disputes), aff’d, 342 B.R. 122 (S.D.N.Y.); In re Fibermark, Inc., 330 B.R.
480 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005) (describing dispute among creditors’ committee members
regarding alleged breaches of fiduciary duties and claims trading order); In re Malkus,
Inc., No. 03-07711, 2004 WL 3202212, at *3–4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2004) (denying plan confirmation where debtor, through principals, ignored court orders and
failed to adhere to duties under Bankruptcy Code); In re Venturelink Holdings, Inc.,
299 B.R. 420 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that creditors’ committee member
had a disqualifying conflict of interest where he received large sums of money prepetition while serving as the debtor’s chairman of the board); In re Coram Healthcare
Corp., 271 B.R. 228 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (denying plan confirmation where the
debtor’s CEO also had a consulting contract with one of the debtor’s largest noteholders); Locks v. U.S. Tr., 157 B.R. 89, 91 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (affirming lower
court’s holding that a creditors’ committee member’s “advocacy on behalf of [future
asbestos claimants] violated his pre-existing fiduciary duty to prepetition claimants,
posing a conflict of interest that required dismissal of his Motion”).
85 See, e.g., Mirant Ams. Energy Mktg., L.P. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Enron Corp., No. 02 Civ. 6274 (GBD), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18149, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2003) (analyzing different interests represented by single creditors’
committee and observing that “ ‘[s]uch conflicts are not unusual in reorganization’
[and] [i]ndeed, ‘they are inherent in all bankruptcy cases,’ and ‘inevitable’ in complex cases, such as the jointly administered one at bar” (quoting In re Altair Arlines,
Inc., 727 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R. 767, 770
(Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1989))); see also Harvey R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter
11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent
Corporations, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 1468 (1993) (“The directors of the debtor
as DIP continue to owe the twin fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to both the creditors and stockholders of the debtor corporation. However, these beneficiaries often
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hazards is challenging.86 The fiduciaries largely control the conduct
and information evidencing the self-interest and conflict; the beneficiaries, the bankruptcy court, and the U.S. trustee may not be aware of
the issue or only learn about it after the fact.
This dependency of beneficiaries, the bankruptcy court and the
U.S. trustee on the DIP and the committee for information may, in
part, explain why parties rarely seek or obtain the appointment of a
Chapter 11 trustee.87 Although use of a DIP is the default rule in
Chapter 11, § 1104 does contemplate the appointment of a disinterested trustee under certain circumstances.88 For example, the court
may appoint a Chapter 11 trustee “for cause” or “if such appointment
is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other
interests of the estate.”89 Parties simply may not have the information
they need to request a trustee. Parties also may use the information
they do have to extract concessions from the DIP that benefit them
personally, but not the bankruptcy estate generally.90
A Chapter 11 trustee, if appointed, serves the same type of role as
a trustee under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The trustee displaces the debtor’s management and controls most decisions relating
to the business and the bankruptcy.91 The primary difference is that
the Chapter 11 trustee must decide whether to pursue a plan of reor-

have conflicting interests as to the administration of a bankruptcy case, the development of a plan of reorganization, or any alternative. These conflicts become even
more aggravated when the corporation is insolvent.”).
86 See Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 760 (1978) (proposing special conflict of interest rules
because “violations of fiduciary duty are frequently very difficult to detect”).
87 See Dickerson, supra note 11, at 888–900 (explaining the requirements for
appointing a Chapter 11 trustee and observing that “[t]hough the Code provides that
managers can be replaced or supervised by a public trustee, trustee appointments are,
and always have been, rare”); see also Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties
in Bankruptcy, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2007) (noting the rarity of trustee
appointments and arguing that Chapter 11 trustees, rather than derivative lawsuits,
are a more effective means of disciplining management of a distressed company).
88 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006) (explaining grounds to support appointment of
Chapter 11 trustee); see also In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1228 (3d Cir.
1989) (affirming lower court’s order appointing Chapter 11 trustee and explaining
requirements of § 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code).
89 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), (2).
90 The stigma attaching to a bankruptcy trustee also may be to blame. This possibility and its relation to the case facilitator proposal is discussed infra Part V.E.
91 See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (defining a Chapter 11 trustee’s duties, in part, by
reference to the duties of a trustee under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code).
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ganization or convert or dismiss the case.92 The Chapter 11 trustee
also generally has more flexibility to continue to operate the business
for a longer period of time.93
Although the DIP, the committee, and the trustee serve most
fiduciary functions in Chapter 11, the Bankruptcy Code also permits
the appointment of an examiner and subjects most meaningful transactions to bankruptcy court approval.94 These provisions are important tools in protecting stakeholders’ interests, but again their
usefulness is limited by information asymmetry in most Chapter 11
cases. “[T]he bankruptcy judge can only act on information and
transactions that are presented to her.”95
The remainder of this article analyzes the roles of DIPs and committees in practice and alternatives to relying primarily on these two
fiduciaries to protect stakeholders’ interests. Not every Chapter 11
case is crippled by conflict and self-interest, but anecdotal evidence
suggests that the problem is prevalent, costly and warrants fresh
examination.
III. CONFLICT

AND

CONTROL CONTESTS

IN

CHAPTER 11

Conflicts and self-interest are common in Chapter 11 cases.96 For
example, the debtor’s management may try to compensate for prepetition decisions leading to the bankruptcy or salvage value for shareholders when those options in fact only delay the case and dissipate
92 See id. § 1106(a)(5) (requiring Chapter 11 trustee to “file a plan under section
1121 of this title, file a report of why the trustee will not file a plan, or recommend
conversion of the case to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13 of this title or dismissal of
the case”).
93 Compare id. § 1106(a)(3) (giving Chapter 11 trustee discretion to continue to
operate the debtor’s business with no explicit time restrictions), with id. § 721 (“The
court may authorize the [Chapter 7] trustee to operate the business of the debtor for
a limited period, if such operation is in the best interest of the estate and consistent
with the orderly liquidation of the estate.”).
94 Id. § 1104(c) (providing that, under certain circumstances, “the court shall
order the appointment of an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor
as is appropriate”).
95 Frost, supra note 13, at 114; see also Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does
Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the TwentyFirst Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 189 (2004) (“Once the plan is presented, the
bankruptcy court is without means to independently assess the plan’s feasibility and
overcome the weight of the combined creditors and submerged debtors appearing
before it urging confirmation.”).
96 See supra Part II.B.3; see also Eklund & Roberts, supra note 15, at 130 (“The
problem is that although all creditors can understand and share the same basic goal
of maximizing the estate and the return for their creditor class, there exists inherent
conflicts between creditors.”).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-2\NDL201.txt

492

unknown

Seq: 24

notre dame law review

9-MAY-11

9:31

[vol. 86:2

value.97 If the debtor has new management put in place by or at the
request of prepetition creditors, management may pursue options in
the interests of only those creditors. Likewise, creditors, competitors
and potential purchasers may try to influence the debtor, the committee and the overall process in a manner favorable to their interests,
regardless of the impact on the bankruptcy estate generally.98
Moreover, conflicts and self-interest are occurring more frequently as debtors’ key creditor relationships shift from traditional
commercial banks to hedge funds, private equity firms and other nontraditional lenders. The problem relates in part to a break in “rela97 See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23 (2003) (“Moreover, even if market controls discourage directors from making decisions that cause the firm’s insolvency, the ‘final
period’ problem will make managers indifferent to market controls once the firm
becomes insolvent. The final period problem arises when a person fears that she is
about to lose her job and senses that she will be unable to secure equal or better
employment.”); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1947 (2003) (exploring how management self-interest biases
affect decision making and stating that “[a]n analysis of management and director
behavior reveals several cognitive biases that may contribute to sub-optimal decisionmaking in the last period of play”); Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On
the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163,
208–09 (1997) (explaining structural bias and management bias toward either shareholders or creditors and how bias might impact corporate governance and insolvency); see also Stephen J. Lubben, Some Realism About Reorganization: Explaining the
Failure of Chapter 11 Theory, 106 DICK. L. REV. 267, 292–93 (2001) (suggesting that
management-shareholder bias is a myth, at least in the insolvency context where management likely will favor interests of creditors).
98 See, e.g., Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and the Debtor in
Possession’s Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 546 (1992) (“Second, if two or
more classes of creditors exist to negotiate with, management may be more partial to
the class that wants to retain management on the best terms to operate the business of
the reorganized debtor. In both situations, management has a fiduciary duty to do
what is best for the estate and creditors, and has a potentially conflicting interest in
doing what is best for management.”); Steve H. Nickles, Behavioral Effect of New Bankruptcy Law on Management and Lawyers: Collage of Recent Statutes and Cases Discouraging
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 59 ARK. L. REV. 329, 379 (2006) (“Acrimony [and conflict
between debtors and creditors] seem[ ] likely to increase if, as this article suggests,
the new bankruptcy law increases the risks of liability for management. Creditors will
become more emboldened and aggressive against management, and management
will become more defensive with respect to creditors.”); see also Eklund & Roberts,
supra note 15, at 130 (“Creditors who serve on official committees, whose goal is to
divvy an insufficient pie, are susceptible to the pressure of conflicts in their individual
capacities.”); Carolyn Okomo, ALF to Send Plan to Creditors, DEAL, Mar. 26, 2008 (noting that debtor was seeking to remove its former parent company from the creditors’
committee for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty that included offering employment
positions to the debtor’s employees); cases cited supra note 84.
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tionship lending” and in part to the motives and objectives of this new
creditor body.99 These creditors are increasingly using Chapter 11 to
facilitate above-market returns on distressed investments, to influence
governance or operational decisions, or to obtain ownership control
of the debtor.100
A. Creditor Conflict
Bankruptcy generally is viewed as a zero-sum game.101 The
debtor has a limited pool of assets, and creditors want to maximize
their percentage share of those assets. Consequently, a larger percentage recovery to one creditor or class of creditors means a smaller
share for others. Although the distribution order in bankruptcy technically is predetermined by the absolute priority rule, creditors frequently negotiate around this rule.102 As a result, creditors use
99 See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
100 See, e.g., Contrarian Funds, LLC v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc. (In re Westpoint
Stevens, Inc.), 333 B.R. 30, 34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing costly control contest between one group of creditors led by investor Wilbur Ross and another group of
creditors led by Carl Icahn); In re A.V.B.I., Inc., 143 B.R. 738, 738–39 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1992) (describing control contest between former management and shareholders that resulted in an unconfirmable plan proposing only a nominal distribution to
unsecured creditors); see also H. Slayton Dabney, Jr. & Richelle Eisendrath, When
Hedge Funds Compete, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2007/Jan. 2008, at 22 (describing control contests and related consequences in the Chapter 11 cases of In re Delphi Corp.,
Ch. 11 Case No. 05-44481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2005), In re Dana Corp., Ch. 11
Case No. 06-10354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2006), and In re Granite Broadcasting,
Inc., 369 B.R. 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 470 (2003) (noting
prevalence of control contests in Chapter 11 cases).
101 A zero-sum game typically exists where a gain for one party necessarily results
in a loss to another party. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the Creditors’ Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (“The
contest between debtor and creditor is almost always zero-sum . . . .”); James J. White,
Failure and Forgiveness: A Review, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435, 447 (1999) (“[B]ankruptcy is
usually a zero sum game, where more for me is less for you . . . .”); see also David Gray
Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1635, 1637 (1998)
(explaining general theory behind zero-sum principle and its application in secured
lending context).
102 See Donald S. Bernstein, A Reorganization Lawyer’s Perspective on Professor Warren’s
Vanishing Trials: The New Age of American Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 942, 946 (2005)
(“Though legal scholars have from time to time raised questions about why a senior
class would compromise its right to invoke the absolute priority rule, the cost of litigating the issue, the delay involved and the uncertainty involved in valuation litigation
without a market test often can be sufficient incentives to motivate the senior class to
settle.”). But see Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Credits & JPMorgan
Chase Bank (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007) (revoking
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prepetition contract terms, postpetition financing and litigation
threats, among other things, to negotiate for better treatment in the
bankruptcy distribution.
In addition, certain investors target the debt of distressed corporations as a means to obtain control of the corporation or its assets.103
These investors purchase debt at various levels of the debtor’s capital
structure and then use the terms of that debt instrument and their
voting rights under the Bankruptcy Code to influence the debtor’s
restructuring.104 Distressed debt investors successfully used this strategy in, among others, the Chapter 11 cases of In re Allied Holdings,
Inc.,105 In re Granite Broadcasting, Inc.,106 In re Kmart Corp.,107 In re Radnor Holdings Corp.,108 and In re Werner Holding Co.109
Whether a creditor is seeking a larger return or control of the
corporation, it tries to influence or control the restructuring process
to achieve its objectives. The creditor’s objective and pursuit of control in turn might conflict with the debtor’s restructuring plan or the
efforts of other creditors or shareholders to influence the process.110
This conflict and self-interested conduct often lead to delay, additional costs and diminished returns to stakeholders.
For example, in the Adelphia Communications Corp., Chapter 11
cases, conflict developed among the creditors of the debtor parent
settlement between committee and senior lenders that allocated estate funds to a litigation vehicle in violation of the absolute priority rule). The absolute priority rule,
codified in §§ 1129(b) and 726 of the Bankruptcy Code, requires that claims and
interests be paid according to their seniority in the debtor’s capital structure and that
a senior class be paid in full before any distributions are made to junior classes.
103 See Henderson, supra note 4, at 1568 & n.127 (“While the market for the debt
and trade claims of distressed firms is growing, it remains a small component of traditional debt and equity markets, and is inhabited largely by firms that specialize in this
type of investing.”); see also Marjorie L. Girth, Rethinking Fairness in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 449, 470–71 (1999) (“Another significant fairness concern
arising in the context of claims trading is the buyer’s potential to acquire enough
claims to block the confirmation of any Chapter 11 plan that it deemed
unsatisfactory.”).
104 For a description of the strategies and objectives of distressed debt investors,
see data and sources discussed in Harner, supra note 17.
105 Ch. 11 No. 05-1251 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 2, 2006).
106 369 B.R. 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
107 Ch. 11 No. 02-02474 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2003).
108 353 B.R. 820 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
109 Ch. 11 No. 06-10578(KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. June 12, 2006).
110 See, e.g., Cynthia A. Baker, Other People’s Money: The Problem of Professional Fees in
Bankruptcy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 35, 52–53 (1996) (exploring committee member selfinterest in the retention of committee counsel and noting that “[t]he personal interests of committee members may also lead to decisions to purchase professional services, where the benefit received is not shared by the entire constituency”).
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corporation and a debtor affiliate corporation regarding the sale of
the debtors’ assets and the allocation of the proceeds under a plan.111
This conflict also involved the debtors, the official creditors’ committee, and the official equity holders’ committee and generated multiple, complex disputes that consumed and paralyzed the debtors’
reorganization for almost five years.112 The debtors ultimately consummated the sale of their assets and confirmed a distribution plan,
but only after years of conflict and cost that depleted the estate value
that otherwise would have been available to pay stakeholders.113
Similar intercreditor conflict arose in the Chapter 11 cases of In
re American Remanufacturers, Inc.114 and Fibermark, Inc.115 In the American Remanufacturers case, a control contest between the senior secured
lenders and two junior debtholders forced the debtor to convert its
case to a Chapter 7 case.116 A member of the senior lending group
bought the debtor’s assets in Chapter 7 for approximately $7.7 million—substantially less than the value contemplated by the debtor’s
proposed restructuring strategy in Chapter 11.117 The Fibermark inter111 See Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, 365 and 1146(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code and Rules 2002, 6004, 6006, and 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Seeking Approval of: (I) A Form of Notice Regarding Certain Hearing Dates & Objection Deadlines; (II) New Provisions for Termination and for the
Payment or Crediting of the Breakup Fee; (III) The Sale of Substantially All Assets of
Adelphia Communications Corp. & Its Affiliated Debtors to Time Warner NY Cable
LLC & Certain Other Assets to Comcast Corp. Free & Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, & Interests & Exempt from Applicable Transfer Taxes; (IV) The Retention,
Assumption &/or Assignment of Certain Agreements, Contracts & Leases; & (V) The
Granting of Related Relief at 4–13, In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 336 B.R. 610
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 02-41729 (REG)).
112 See id.; see also In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. 54, 58–59 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006) (detailing certain aspects of the intercreditor disputes).
113 See In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 242 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(holding that plan was fair and equitable in part because “[t]he expense and delay
occasioned by the continued litigation . . . would prejudice”).
114 Ch. 11 No. 05-20022 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 7, 2007).
115 No. 04-10463 (Bankr. D. Vt. Aug. 16, 2005), available at http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/WSJ-HarveMiller_report.pdf.
116 See Motion for an Order Pursuant to Sections 361, 363 & 364 of the Bankruptcy Code (1) Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing, (2)
Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral, (3) Authorizing Repayment of Certain Prepetition Secured Debt, (4) Granting Liens & Superpriority Administrative Expense Status, (5) Providing Adequate Protection & (6) Scheduling & Approving the Form &
Method of Notice of Final Hearing at 7, In re Am. Remanufacturers, Ch. 11 No. 0520022 (PJW); In re Am. Remanufacturers, Inc., Ch. 7 No. 05-20022 (PJW) (Bankr. D.
Del. Nov. 17, 2007) (converting Chapter 11 cases to Chapter 7 cases).
117 See In re Am. Remanufacturers, Inc., No. 05-20022 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov.
17, 2007) (converting Chapter 11 cases to Chapter 7 cases); see also FITCH RATINGS, A
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creditor dispute cost the estate approximately $60 million.118 Other
examples of control contests and intercreditor disputes include In re
Pliant Corp.119 and In re eToys Direct 1, LLC.120
B. Debtor-Committee Conflict
Conflicting interests can place the debtor and the statutory committee at odds.121 Although a committee’s challenge to debtor conCASE STUDY APPROACH TO U.S. SECOND-LIEN LEVERAGED LOAN RECOVERY EXPECTATIONS
5 (2007) (“A member of the company’s senior lender group subsequently purchased
the company’s inventory assets at a fire sale for $ 7.7 million.”); David Peress &
Thomas C. Prinzhorn, Nontraditional Lenders and the Impact of Loan-to-Own Strategies on
the Restructuring Process, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2006, at 48, 57 (“After four days of
confusing disputes about definitions of third parties, priming and subordination, the
company lawyers informed the court that the company had run out of cash and converted to a chapter 7 liquidation.”). The sale proposed in the debtor’s original Chapter 11 filing was valued at approximately $32 million. See Motion for Order
Authorizing & Approving (A) An Asset Purchase Agreement Subject to Higher & Better Offers, (B) Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets, Free & Clear of Liens,
Claims, Encumbrances & Interests, (C) Assumption & Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts, (D) Assumption of Certain Liabilities, & (E) Granting Related Relief
at 3, In re Am. Remanufacturers, Inc., No. 05-20022 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 7,
2005) (describing original sale terms).
118 See Report of Harvey R. Miller, as Examiner at 12, In re FiberMark, No. 04-10463.
119 Ch. 11 No. 09-10443 (Bankr. D. Del.); see Bill Rochelle, Bashas’, Flying J, Charter,
Pliant, Tousa: Bankruptcy (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=MSFT:US&sid=AssOhkekB0bI (describing conflict between first-lienholders, second lienholders and unsecured creditors
and competing plans).
120 Ch. 11 No. 08-13412 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 23, 2009); see, e.g., Debtors’
Motion to Convert Cases from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re
eToys Direct 1, LLC, No. 08-13412 (BLS) (explaining dispute among debtors, pre-petition first lienholders, prepetition second lienholders, creditors’ committee, and postpetition lenders and requesting conversion of Chapter 11 cases as a result of the parties’ inability to resolve dispute). The parties in the eToys Chapter 11 cases ultimately
settled their dispute, allowing the sale of the debtors’ assets to proceed in Chapter 11.
See Order Approving Settlement Agreement with Mutual Release Among the Debtors,
the Committee, & the Lenders at Exhibit A, In re eToys Direct 1, LLC, No. 08-13412
(BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 18, 2009) (approving settlement agreement).
121 See, e.g., Marie Beaudette, Calpine Urges Court to Keep Consulting Firm on Chapter
11 Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 5, 2007 (shareholders’ committee objected to
debtor’s retention of consulting firm because of alleged conflict of interest, which
debtor and creditors’ committee claimed was resolved); Okomo, supra note 98 (committee seeking appointment of trustee and debtor seeking to remove its former parent company from the creditors’ committee for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty
that included offering employment positions to the debtor’s employees); Viewpoint,
Montgomery Ward: Genuine Reorganization or GECC’s Fig Leaf?, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP)
1 (Apr. 27, 1999) (detailing dispute between the committee, on the one hand, and
the debtor and GECC (the debtor’s controlling shareholder, postpetition lender and
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duct is often appropriate and value generating, it also can be the
result of individual preferences of committee members.122 Likewise,
when a committee rightfully objects to debtor conduct, it may be conduct motivated by management self-interest or outside influences over
management.123 And frequently, instability in committee membership (e.g., a member resigning from the committee once the debtor
assumes its contract or pays its debt) can prevent the committee itself
from being a meaningful check on conflicts and self-interest.
Whether the case deals with management or committee member selfinterest, the resulting conflict can impair value and confidence in the
statutory representatives and the overall process.
Debtor and committee member conflict, particularly conflict
accompanied by undue influence, is challenging for stakeholders
both to detect and resolve. A large part of a Chapter 11 case is negoticreditor), on the other); Will Debtors Wielding Rule 2019 Prompt Hedge Fund Retreat, 47
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 4 (Mar. 27, 2007) (explaining conflict between debtor and ad
hoc committee of shareholders regarding committee’s disclosure obligations and noting that committee had objected to the debtor’s request to extend exclusivity and
valuation and was requesting the appointment of an examiner); Liz McKenzie, Creditors Win Bid to End Fremont Plan Exclusivity, LAW360 (July 15, 2009), http://www.law
360.com/articles/11532 (reporting that court granted creditors’ committee’s motion
to terminate Fremont General Corporation’s exclusive period to file a plan); Evan
Weinberger, Creditors Seek Block on Lyondell Exec Payouts, LAW360 (July 20, 2009), http:/
/www.law360.com/articles/112218 (explaining basis of creditors’ committee’s objection to Lyondell Chemical Company’s employee retention plan). Disputes between a
debtor and one or more of its committees also can lead to the appointment of a
Chapter 11 trustee or examiner. See, e.g., In re Sonicblue Inc., No. 03-51775, 2007 WL
926871 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2007) (order appointing Chapter 11 trustee where
debtor’s counsel issued a prepetition opinion letter to bondholders now controlling
committee and whose claims were subject to challenge by the debtor and junior creditors); Shannon D. Murray, Nellson to Seek End to Probe, DEAL, July 12, 2007 (reporting
that debtor and ad hoc committee of first lienholders were asking court to revoke
appointment of examiner, which was triggered by dispute with creditors’ committee).
122 See generally Michael P. Richman & Jonathan E. Aberman, Creditors’ Committees
Under the Microscope: Recent Developments Highlight Hazards of Self-Dealing, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Sept. 2007, at 22 (describing conflict between debtors and committees and
among committee members and discussing cases in which committee member selfinterest posed obstacles to the debtor’s restructuring plan).
123 For example, in support of its objection to Lyondell’s executive retention plan,
the creditors’ committee alleged that the debtor’s management breached its fiduciary
duties and was liable for mismanagement with respect to the debtor’s prepetition
business affairs. See Weinberger, supra note 121. Likewise, a committee can scrutinize
a debtor’s prepetition transactions and determine whether they contributed in an
illegal or inappropriate way to the debtor’s financial demise. See, e.g., Jamie Mason,
Steve & Barry’s Back in Chapter 11, DEAL, Nov. 21, 2008 (committee challenging prepetition transaction between debtor and private equity firm, in which the private equity
firm acquired a fifty percent stake in the debtor).
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ated behind the scenes—disputes typically reach the court’s docket
only if there is a complete impasse, which may not occur if one party
caves to the other’s demands.124 Moreover, even once a dispute is
before the court, the only public information about the conflict is that
divulged by the debtor and the committee. The court and stakeholders not allowed in the negotiating room may never know the true
nature or economic consequences of the dispute.
C. Weaknesses in Existing Chapter 11 Process
A negotiated, consensual resolution generally is the desired result
in a Chapter 11 case. That resolution should, however, strive to
achieve the dual goals of the Chapter 11 process: rehabilitating the
debtor and maximizing creditors’ returns. A so-called consensual resolution might not serve those goals if, for example, a group of creditors strong-arms the debtor into selling its assets or if management
(perhaps together with a new equity sponsor) implements an over
leveraged plan of reorganization.
The Bankruptcy Code seeks to protect against such abuses of the
Chapter 11 process by imposing certain duties on the DIP and the
committee; providing the bankruptcy court with substantial case oversight authority; requiring plans to be feasible and in the best interests
of creditors; and facilitating the appointment of a trustee or examiner
in extreme cases.125 Yet, abuses of the process continue, and some
commentators suggest that a complete overhaul or elimination of the
existing structure is warranted.126 The case facilitator proposal discussed here recognizes the substantial value in the existing structure
and seeks to address its weaknesses.
Many Chapter 11 abuses occur because the key players in the case
have a vested interest in the restructuring. Even the professionals
retained by the debtors and the committee are not completely free of
124 See Randall J. Newsome, Vanishing Trials—What’s the Fuss All About?, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 973, 973 (2005) (discussing decrease in bankruptcy litigation and the role
of negotiation and compromise in that development); Judge Barr Praises Professionals in
Centis Bankruptcy, 43 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 5 (July 28, 2004) (“I appreciate all of the
effort that went into the ‘behind-the-scenes’ process which is always necessary to the
things the court doesn’t see but we sense . . . .” (quoting Judge James N. Barr)).
125 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
126 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 751 (2002) (exploring the shift from corporate reorganizations to corporate liquidations and causes underlying that shift); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach
to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1851 (1998) (“The Essay’s central claim is
captured in a variation on a trendy slogan: Privatize bankruptcy.”); discussion supra
Part II.B.3.
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conflict and loyalty issues, depending on both professional and personal ties that exist prior to the case or are anticipated to develop
after.127 But each of these players, including the professionals, can
add substantial value to the process. For example, the DIP and its
management have the historical knowledge, business expertise and
industry relationships that often are essential to a successful restructuring. Likewise, key creditors and shareholders have the ability to
compromise claims and perhaps invest new capital.
Any workable solution should not exclude these key players or
limit their roles. Rather, the solution lies in facilitating more meaningful, objective and efficient dialogue among the parties. To develop
this solution, this Article draws on elements of existing U.S. bankruptcy law, as well as foreign insolvency law and alternative dispute
resolution techniques.
IV. ALTERNATIVES

TO

CHAPTER 11

As explained above, the general rule in U.S. corporate reorganizations is that the corporate debtor stays in possession of its property
and in control of its restructuring efforts with relatively little interference from the bankruptcy court or the U.S. trustee. This approach is
commonly referred to as a U.S.-style or Chapter 11–style reorganization. Although some countries like Belgium, Canada, China, France,
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom have adopted aspects of a
Chapter 11–style reorganization, most countries balance the control
retained by the corporate debtor with more intrusive governmental or
judicial oversight.128 Moreover, many countries mandate the appointment of an administrator, receiver or other trustee upon the commencement of any corporate bankruptcy.129
127 A similar conflict issue exists for any professional manager retained by a company, commonly called a chief restructuring officer, at the behest of creditors. See
Dickerson, supra note 11, at 918–27 (explaining use of chief restructuring officers,
which Professor Dickerson characterizes as “private trustees” and potential issues with
their retention).
128 See infra note 129; see also Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Policy: A Review and
Critique of Bankruptcy Statutes and Practices in Fifty Countries Worldwide, 16 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 279, 283, 289–302 (2008) (noting the adoption of Chapter 11–style
provisions by several countries and analyzing, among other things, whether countries
displace management completely or partially under corporate insolvency laws); Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276
(2000) (reviewing global bankruptcy reform measures).
129 For example, a trustee, receiver or other court-appointed official is mandated
(either to displace or monitor the debtor) under the corporate reorganization laws of
Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, § 11.7(1)
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This Part briefly explores alternatives to the DIP structure used in
the United States. The Article does not endorse replacing the DIP.
Nevertheless, analyzing alternative approaches can identify tools to
enhance the DIP’s restructuring efforts.
A. The Canadian Monitor
The development of Canadian corporate insolvency law follows a
pattern similar to the U.S. experience. Canadian insolvency law is federal law, and the Canadian Parliament enacted its primary corporate
reorganization law—the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act
(CCAA)—during the Great Depression.130 Corporations also can
(Can.); (
) [Law of Insolvency] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007) arts. 22, 73 (Chin.), translated in BANKR. LAW & RESTRUCTURING RESEARCH CTR., CHINA UNIV. OF POLITICS &
LAW, ENTERPRISE INSOLVENCY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2007), available at http://transnationallawblog.typepad.com/transnational_law_blog/files/China
BankoLaw2007.pdf; Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 1(2), 32, Sch. B1 (Eng.), available
at Insolvency Act of 1986, LEGISLATION.GOV.UK, http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.
aspx?activeTextDocId=2519933; CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] arts. L621-8, L631-9
(Fr.), available in English at http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_32.pdf;
Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [Insolvency Act], Oct. 5, 1994, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL.] at 2866, §§ 56, 274 1994 I (Ger.); VITTORIO LUPOLI & ANDREA DE TOMAS,
GLOBAL LEGAL GRP., THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO CORPORATE
RECOVERY AND INSOLVENCY: ITALY 132 (2008), available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/
khadmin/Publications/pdf/2012.pdf (explaining that in Italy, “[t]he Bankruptcy
Court appoints the judge in charge of the procedure and the official receiver. The
judge directs the whole procedure and authorises the extraordinary administration
acts proposed by the official receiver”); ALBERTO NÚÑEZ-LAGOS BURGUERA & ÁNGEL
ALONSO HERNÁNDEZ, GLOBAL LEGAL GRP., THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL
GUIDE TO CORPORATE RECOVERY AND INSOLVENCY: SPAIN 215 (2008), available at http:/
/www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/2024.pdf (explaining that in Spain,
“[d]uring the common phase, the Judge will appoint the members of the trustees
panel, whose main function is to determine the debtor’s estate and existing debts,
and to control the management of the debtor’s business”); European Judicial Network, Bankruptcy—Belgium, EUR. COMMISSION (May 31, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/
civiljustice/bankruptcy/bankruptcy_bel_en.htm (last updated May 31, 2006) (stating
that in Belgium, the Commercial Court designates at least one receiver pursuant to
Judicial Administrative Act §15(1)(2) and the court designates at least one liquidator
in the process of Bankruptcy pursuant to section 11(1) of the Bankruptcy Act of
August 8, 1997, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Oct. 28,
1997).
130 See 2 MICHAEL J. MACNAUGHTON ET AL., DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA § 12.05
(2009) (“Originally enacted during the Depression and attaining new prominence in
the 1980’s, the CCAA currently is the primary restructuring statute used in Canada for
large corporate enterprises.”). A corporation must be insolvent and have aggregate
liabilities of at least $5 million to commence a case under the CCAA. Id. The insolvency requirement is defined by reference to Canada’s Bankruptcy and Insolvency
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elect to liquidate their assets in a process akin to Chapter 7 under the
Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.131
Similarities exist between the CCAA and Chapter 11, and corporations in cross-border insolvency cases often pursue reorganizations
under both statutes.132 A corporate debtor under the CCAA can
obtain a stay of proceedings, debtor in possession financing and certain other protections afforded debtors under Chapter 11. Those protections largely are crafted by the court and parties, however, under
the general guidelines of the CCAA and are not necessarily imposed

Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (Can.), and Winding-Up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. W-11 (Can.), which generally incorporate both the balance sheet and cash flow
insolvency tests. In addition, “a debtor may be considered insolvent if the debtor
faces a ‘looming liquidity crisis’ or is in the ‘proximity’ of insolvency even if it is making its obligations as they become due.” Id. “The principle purpose of the Companies’
Creditors Arrangement Act is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement
between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is
able to continue in business.” In re Federal Gypsum Co., [2007] N.S.J. 558 (Can.
N.S.S.C.), 2007 NS.C. LEXIS 635, at *7 (citation omitted) (quoting In re Juniper Lumber Co., [2000] N.B.J. 144 (Can. N.B.C.A.)). Certain amendments to the CCAA went
into effect on September 18, 2009. The amendments generally seek “[t]o encourage
restructuring of viable businesses as an alternative to bankruptcy [and to] provide
increased predictability and consistency while preserving its flexibility.” Summary of
Legislative Changes, OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKR. CAN., http://www.ic.gc.
ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01782.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2010).
131 See MACNAUGHTON ET AL., supra note 130, § 12.02 (discussing the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act). A corporation also may reorganize its business under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, but its structure is more suitable for smaller companies
and less complex reorganizations. Id. § 12.05.
132 For example, Quebecor World Inc. and its affiliated debtors simultaneously
received orders sanctioning their Second Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization and Compromise (in Canada) and confirming their Third Amended Joint Plan
of Reorganization (in the United States). See, e.g., Press Release, Quebecor World’s
U.S. and Canadian Plans of Reorganization Approved by U.S. Bankruptcy Court and
Quebec Superior Court (July 2, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
pressRelease/idUS208777+02-Jul-2009+MW20090702.
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by federal statute as under Chapter 11.133 Moreover, the CCAA mandates the appointment of a monitor in every case.134
The Canadian monitor is an officer of the court and typically a
licensed bankruptcy trustee associated with a major accounting
firm.135 The monitor’s duties include “monitoring the company’s
business and financial affairs . . . [and examining] the company’s
property, including the premises, books, records [and] data”; filing a
report with the court “on the state of the company’s business and
financial affairs”; and communicating with the company’s creditors.136
As at least one court and commentator have explained:
[The monitor] is the court’s eyes and ears with a mandate to assist
the court in its supervisory role. The monitor is not an advocate for
the debtor company or any party in the CCAA process. It has a duty
to evaluate the activities of the debtor company and comment independently on such actions in any report to the court and the
creditors.137

The monitor does not displace the debtor or its management
team. In fact, the role of the monitor was developed by the Canadian
Parliament as an alternative to the creditors’ committees appointed in
the Chapter 11 process.138 Although some commentators question
133 See MACNAUGHTON ET AL., supra note 130, § 12.05 (explaining how many critical components of a debtor’s restructuring are left largely to the discretion of the
court, with only vague, if any, statutory guidance). In general, a corporate debtor uses
a CCAA proceeding to negotiate a plan of arrangement with its creditors that restructures its debt obligations. The plan must be approved by “[a] majority in number
representing two thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors . . . present and
voting either in person or by proxy” and sanctioned by the court. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36,
§ 6 (Can.).
134 See R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, § 11.7(1) (Can.) (“When an order is made on the
initial application in respect of a debtor company, the court shall at the same time
appoint a person to monitor the business and financial affairs of the company.”).
135 See PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY § 10-022 (2007)
(“The monitor is usually an accounting firm.”). The CCAA requires that the monitor
be a licensed “trustee, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act.” R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, § 11.7(1) (Can.).
136 See R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, § 11.7 (Can.) (setting forth the role and duties of a
monitor).
137 In re Pine Valley Mining Corp., [2008] B.C.J. 637 (Can. B.C.S.C.), 2008 BC.C.
LEXIS 702, at *14 (quoting KEVIN P. MCELCHERAN, COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY IN
CANADA 236 (2005)).
138 See Janis Sarra, Ethics and Conflicts, the Role of Insolvency Professionals in the Integrity of the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency System, 13 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 167, 175
(2004) (“The introduction of the monitor in CCAA proceedings was in part a Canadian response to the US practice of having creditors’ committees in Chapter 11 workouts . . . .”); see also Evan D. Flaschen, Suggestions for the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission and Congress: Independent Monitors in Chapter 11, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
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whether a monitor is really neutral in performing its duties, most
courts and commentators believe the process works.139 Commentators often cite the CCAA proceedings of Air Canada—a complex
restructuring accomplished in eighteen months—to bolster their support for the process.140
B. The French Judicial Administrator
A distressed corporation generally has three formal insolvency
options under French law—a safeguard proceeding, a judicial reorganization or a judicial liquidation.141 The corporation cannot be
technically insolvent under French law to invoke the safeguard proceeding; in fact, French law requires corporations to commence a
judicial reorganization or liquidation within forty-five days of becoming insolvent.142 Rather, the safeguard proceeding is designed to help
corporations anticipate and avoid technical insolvency, thereby preserving the value of the corporation’s business for all stakeholders.143
514 (1996) (suggesting the appointment of a monitor with powers similar to a Chapter 11 examiner in Chapter 11 cases); Yaad Rotem, Contemplating a Corporate Governance Model for Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Lessons from Canada, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 125,
150 (2008) (proposing the Canadian monitor as an effective example of hybrid (i.e.,
some combination of the roles of a DIP and bankruptcy trustee) governance in insolvency proceedings).
139 Rotem, supra note 138, at 147–50.
140 For a discussion of the results of Air Canada’s restructuring, see Press Release,
Air Canada Expects to Record an Estimated $235 Million of Operating Income Before
Reorganization and Restructuring Items for the Third Quarter 2004 (Oct. 27, 2004),
available at http://www.aircanada.jp/news/jpen-20041027.pdf.
141 See Mark Broude et al., An Overview of Global Insolvency Regimes, in THE GUIDE
TO DISTRESSED DEBT AND TURNAROUND INVESTING 31, 43–44 (2006) (explaining these
three formal insolvency proceedings). French law also provides two additional preinsolvency options, the mandataire ad hoc and the conciliation. See C. COM. arts. L611-3,
L611-4 (Fr.). A conciliation also is commonly called a composition, as the Commercial
Code only refers to a “composition procedure” and “conciliators.” See CLIFFORD
CHANCE LLP, EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES 14 (2010), available at http://www.
cliffordchance.com/showimage/showimage.aspx?LangID=de&binaryname=/handout%20euro%20insolvency%20procedures2.pdf (“The Conciliation (Proce’ dure de
Conciliation) . . . was introduced in 1984 and is governed by articles L.611-4 et seq. of
the French Commercial Code.”).
142 See C. COM. art. L631-4 (Fr.) (“The commencement of these proceedings must
be requested by the debtor at the latest within the forty-five days following the cessation of payments if the debtor has not, within this time limit, requested the commencement of conciliation proceedings.”).
143 See CHANCE, supra note 141, at 14; Broude et al., supra note 141, at 43–44
(explaining objectives of the safeguard). Safeguard Proceedings are “aimed at recovery if the debtor establishes that, although not insolvent, he is facing difficulties which
he is unable to overcome on his own”).
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The safeguard proceeding “was inspired in part by U.S. chapter
11” and, accordingly, permits the debtor and its management to
remain in place during the proceeding.144 The debtor’s management
may continue to operate the business, negotiate with creditors and
employees and maintain its positions in the reorganized corporation.145 The debtor is not the only party, however, with a key role in
the reorganization process. The safeguard procedure contemplates
significant participation by the court, a court nominee, controllers
(who represent creditors), certain committees and a judicial
administrator.146
The judicial administrator does not displace the debtor, but it
“supervise[s] the debtor’s management operations . . . [or assists] the
debtor in all or some of the management.”147 The judicial administrator also has ongoing reporting obligations to the court and the court
nominee and is charged with developing the debtor’s plan of reorganization.148 Similar to the Canadian monitor, the judicial administrator
144 ALLEN & OVERY BULLETING, ROAD TESTING THE NEW FRENCH SAFEGUARD PROCE(2006). Under a safeguard proceeding, the debtor works under the supervision
of the court and the court-appointed officials to negotiate a restructuring plan. See
C. COM. art. L621-4 (Fr.) (explaining court appointments in proceeding). The plan
must be approved by the court, after it has been submitted to the court nominee,
controllers and certain other parties and the necessary assents are obtained. Id. art.
L626-2 (listing plan requirements); id. arts. L626-9 to L626-11 (plan confirmation
process).
145 Id. art. L622-1 (“The management of the business shall be carried out by its
manager.”); id. art. L622-3 (“The debtor shall continue to carry out acts of disposal
and management over his personal estate as well as to exercise rights and actions not
included within the administrator’s duties.”).
146 See id. art. L622-1 (“Where the Court, in accordance with the provisions of
Article L621-4, appoints one or more administrators, it will assign them to jointly or
individually supervise the debtor’s management operations or to assist the debtor in
all or some of the management.”); id. art. L622-20 (“Only the court nominee
appointed by the Court may act on behalf and in the general interest of the creditors.”). The court nominee is essentially a representative for the creditors and serves
as a liaison between the controllers (i.e., creditors appointed by the court to serve in
an official capacity) and the court. Id.; see also id. art. L621-10 (discussing appointment of controllers).
147 Id. art. L622-1. The provisions governing safeguard proceedings were
amended in 2009 to, among other things, allow the debtor company to propose to the
court the name of an individual to serve as the administrator. See, e.g., FRESHFIELDS
BURCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, BRIEFING: FRENCH INSOLVENCY LAW (2009), available at
www.freshfields.de/publications/pdfs/2009/feb09/25197.pdf.
148 Id. art. L623-1 (requiring the administrator to draft a report regarding the
debtor’s economic and employment situation); id. art. L623-3 (requiring the administrator to consult with the court nominee and the court).
DURE
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is appointed by the court and mandated in every safeguard
proceeding.149
Eurotunnel was among the first distressed corporations to test the
safeguard procedures. In 2007, Eurotunnel implemented its reorganization plan and, shortly thereafter, posted a small profit and issued
dividends to shareholders.150 Autodis, a French auto parts maker, also
invoked the safeguard proceeding in 2009 to restructure its debt obligations through, among other things, a debt-for-equity exchange with
its major lenders.151 The Autodis safeguard procedure was completed
in six weeks.
C. The U.K. Administrator
Unlike Canada and France, the United Kingdom does not offer a
formal corporate insolvency procedure that recognizes an official role
for the corporate debtor in the restructuring process.152 Rather, an
administrator is appointed to assume the role and responsibilities of
the debtor’s management in every corporate reorganization case,
149 Id. art. L621-4, at 204 (“[T]he Court shall appoint two court nominees, that is,
a court nominee and an administrator . . . .”).
150 Letter from Jacques Gounon, Chairman & Chief Exec., Group Eurotunnel, to
Shareholders (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.eurotunnel.com/NR/rdonlyres/
C042C4A0-E42F-4040-AB6C-EDA5E1C1FA55/0/090310ETOnTrackMarch.pdf.
151 See Laurent Assaya et al., Autodis: A Surgical Restructuring à la Française, JONES
DAY COMMENT., July 2009, at 1, 1–3, available at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs
_detail.aspx?pubID=S6484 (explaining the Autodis restructuring). The provisions
governing safeguard proceedings were amended in 2010 to, among other things, permit an accelerated or “pre-pack” filing, similar to that accomplished in the Autodis
safeguard proceeding. See, e.g., Benoı̂t Fleury, The French Accelerated Financial Safeguard
(the French “Prepack”), GIBSON DUNN (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/pages/FrenchAcceleratedFinancialSafeguard-FrenchPrepack.aspx.
152 The United Kingdom’s insolvency laws provide both rehabilitation and liquidation alternatives for insolvent corporations. The primary rehabilitation provision is
administration, but corporations also may pursue rehabilitations using a composition
(called a company voluntary arrangement (CVA)) or a scheme of arrangement. A
CVA requires the appointment of a trustee to supervise the restructuring, as it proceeds largely as an out-of-court workout. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 1(2) (“A
proposal under this Part is one which provides for some person (‘the nominee’) to
act in relation to the voluntary arrangement either as trustee or otherwise for the
purpose of supervising its implementation; and the nominee must be a person who is
qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner [or authorised to act as nominee, in
relation to the voluntary arrangement].”) A scheme of arrangement requires a separate judicial proceeding and, consequently, may be used by an administrator in an
administration. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 895–900 (Eng.); see also Highlands
Ins. Co., Proposal in Relation to a Scheme of Arrangement 14–16 (May 1, 2009)
(Eng.), available at http://www.ukhighlands.com/circulars/Scheme%20Document.
pdf (explaining administration proceedings).
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called an administration proceeding.153 The administrator oversees
virtually every aspect of the debtor’s restructuring, including the
development of a restructuring plan and the presentation of that plan
to creditors.154
Nevertheless, the corporation, its directors or its secured creditors may appoint the administrator, which allows the corporate debtor
to play at least an indirect role in the restructuring process.155 Notably, most corporations entering administration elect this option and
frequently appoint bankruptcy professionals associated with one of
the large accounting firms.156 An administrator also has the authority
to, and in most cases does, retain existing management to help the
administrator develop and implement a restructuring plan.157
An administrator is an officer of the court, and its general duties
are detailed in the U.K.’s Insolvency Act.158 The court generally has
little involvement in the administration proceeding, giving the administrator significant discretion to achieve its statutory objectives.
Administrators may pursue a going-concern or piecemeal sale of the
153 See 1986, c. 45, sch. B1 (Eng.). “Administration replaces the existing management and has the effect of imposing a stay on the enforcement of security or any
other legal proceeding against the debtor without the consent of the court or the
administrator.” Audrey Whitfill et al., Jurisdiction Matters for Secured Creditors in Insolvency, STANDARD & POOR’S (Apr. 13, 2006), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/ap/page.article/2,1,1,0,1145997583489.html.
154 See Broude et al., supra note 141, at 41 (“Once appointed, the administrator
basically displaces the company’s directors and assumes broad executive authority and
powers.”).
155 See 1986, c. 45, sch. B1 ¶ ¶ 14, 22 (Eng.).
156 See, e.g., David Jetuah, Deloitte Called in for Wedgewood UK Administration, ACCT.
AGE (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/22332
70/wedgewood-goes-receivership (Wedgewood UK selected four partners from
Deloitte to serve as administrators); John Oates, Nortel UK Goes into Administration to
Save Itself, ENTERPRISE (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2009/01/
15/nortel_europe_administration (Nortel appointed Ernst and Young as its administrators); Setanta UK Goes into Administration, IRISHTIMES (June 23, 2009), http://www.
irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2009/0623/breaking63.html (Setanta
appointed Deloitte as its administrator).
157 See Broude et al., supra note 141, at 41 (“Under a court approved protocol, it is
possible that the administrator may leave much of the day-to-day management decisions to existing management under the administrator’s supervision . . . .”).
158 1986, c. 45, sch. B1 (Eng.). For example, the Insolvency Act instructs the
administrator to pursue a reorganization of the company first, followed by a goingconcern and then piecemeal sale of the company’s assets. Id. § 3(1). The statute
further requires the administrator to pursue the objectives in the stated order and to
forego a particular objective only if she believes “that it is not reasonably practicable
to achieve [the other objectives and she] . . . does not unnecessarily harm the interests of the creditors of the company as a whole.” Id. § 3(4).
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debtor or a stand-alone reorganization.159 The latter typically is
accomplished with the cooperation of management. Distressed corporations and their creditors may even work with an administrator
prior to commencing an administration proceeding to facilitate a
quick restructuring, similar to the prepackaged Chapter 11 cases used
in the United States.160
D. Observations Regarding Chapter 11 Alternatives
The Canadian, French, and U.K. insolvency schemes discussed
here each acknowledge limitations on the court’s role in any given
restructuring and the need for a meaningful check on the corporate
debtor. Even under schemes like French insolvency laws that generally encourage significant involvement by the court, courts cannot participate in the negotiations and day-to-day affairs of the debtor for
practical and other reasons.161 Courts in turn must rely on third parties for accurate and timely information regarding the restructuring.
Most countries, like Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, rely on
a party other than the debtor to fulfill that role.162
The Canadian monitor, the French judicial administrator, and
the U.K. administrator each have reporting obligations to the court
and, to varying degrees, creditors, but there are notable differences
among the three structures. For example, the Canadian monitor does
not necessarily intervene in the restructuring negotiations and is not
responsible for proposing the debtor’s reorganization plan.163 In contrast, the U.K. administrator is directly responsible for the reorganization plan, but the common practice of the administrator being
appointed by or relying on management in that process suggests value
to retaining the debtor’s involvement at some level.
The French judicial administrator’s primary charge is assisting
the debtor, and it must coordinate negotiation activities with the court
159 See Broude et al., supra note 141, at 41 (explaining the broad discretion
granted to an administrator in pursuing reorganization or sale of the debtor or its
assets).
160 See sources and examples cited in Harner, supra note 29, at 748–49 (discussing
the use of prepackaged plans under U.K. insolvency laws).
161 See Broude et al., supra note 141, at 44 (“[T]he presiding judge in a French
bankruptcy has extremely broad powers, both judicially and in the administration of
the debtor’s business, as compared to a bankruptcy judge in the United States . . . .”).
162 See supra note 130.
163 See MACNAUGHTON ET AL., supra note 130, § 12.05[6] (“The debtor and its
creditors usually expect the monitor to comment on the plan, although commenting
is not a requirement.”). But see Sarra, supra note 138, at 178 (“In some cases, the
monitor has developed the plan of arrangement.”).
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nominee and controllers.164 Consequently, the judicial administrator’s role provides a check on the debtor’s conduct, but does not
streamline the process itself. Moreover, the Canadian monitor and
the U.K. administrator may not be truly independent or disinterested
parties; for example, the monitor may be the debtor’s auditor.165 This
lack of independence may create biases and increase rather than
resolve conflicts in the restructuring.
These three insolvency schemes underscore the utility of objective oversight of the debtor and others involved in the restructuring;
meaningful reporting to the court and stakeholders; and a facilitator
to bring the parties together to negotiate and agree upon a restructuring plan. The noted differences suggest opportunities for improvement through the case facilitator proposal. Overall, this analysis
supports viewing corporate restructuring more as alternative dispute
resolution and less as traditional litigation.166
V.

THE CASE FACILITATOR PROPOSAL

Chapter 11 and the DIP model can add value to a corporation’s
restructuring efforts. A debtor’s existing management and employees
have the knowledge, expertise and relationships necessary to any corporation’s successful reorganization.167 They also often know best the
corporation’s weaknesses and what contributed to its financial distress. These individuals are vested, however, in the corporation, and
they may lack the ability to assess objectively the corporation’s financial options.
The case facilitator proposal recognizes the potential weaknesses
in the DIP model and seeks to strengthen the model without discouraging its use. As discussed below, the case facilitator would not displace the debtor’s management or receive any direct authority to act
164 See supra Part IV.B (discussing the French judicial administrator’s duties).
165 See, e.g., Sarra, supra note 138, at 176 (“In the past five years, roughly 33% of
CCAA proceedings involved a monitor that had been the auditor of the debtor corporation . . . .”); see also supra Part IV.C (discussing the debtor’s ability to appoint the
U.K. administrator). Notably, amendments to the CCAA, effective as of September
18, 2009, prohibit the debtor’s auditor from serving as monitor, absent court
approval. See Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, § 11.7
(Can.).
166 See Newsome, supra note 124, at 973 (“Compromise is what makes reorganization possible.”).
167 See generally Miller & Waisman, supra note 14, at 169 (explaining the various
virtues and value of the existing Chapter 11 process); see also Elizabeth Warren & Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 603, 634 (2009) (reporting empirical data showing strengths in the Chapter 11
process).
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on behalf of the debtor.168 Rather, the case facilitator would serve as
the “eyes and ears” of the bankruptcy court and act as a third-party
neutral and plan facilitator for the debtor and all of its
stakeholders.169
The case facilitator proposal also introduces much-needed neutrality into the Chapter 11 process.170 Neutrality in this context
implies a participant without a vested interest in the prepetition relationships among the parties or the ultimate outcome of the case.171
As Professor Westbrook explains: “If a bankruptcy involves competing
168 See infra Part V.A.
169 See supra Part IV (discussing the Canadian monitor, the French judicial administrator, and the U.K. administrator); see also Bussel, supra note 41, at 1618 (“A substantial literature now exists confirming that third-party neutrals (or ‘mediators’ or
‘facilitators’) can be effective in bringing parties to agreement by managing the negotiation process.”). In most Chapter 11 cases, this independent representative is
absent. This void not only leads to the type of conflict discussed supra Parts I.B.3, II,
but also frequently puts the DIP’s counsel in the uncomfortable position of having to
monitor and investigate the conduct of its debtor client. See generally Bowles & Rapoport, supra note 78, at 68 (“[S]everal courts have begun to impose yet another fiduciary duty on Estate Counsel—that of actively overseeing or policing the conduct of the
Debtor during the pendency of a chapter 11 case.”).
170 As discussed in Part II, the balance of power and control in corporate restructurings has shifted from the debtor, to creditors, to an independent trustee and then
back again. See supra Part II. The case facilitator proposal and its focus on neutrality
would help reach a better equilibrium in this balance of power.
171 The Article does not invoke the concept of neutrality to suggest a particular
theoretical model of the corporation in bankruptcy. Rather, the terms neutrality and
stakeholders are used here in the context of resolving competing claims and disputes
that may impede progress in a Chapter 11 case. The dynamics of insolvent firm governance may in fact inform the utility of various models of the corporation, but that
discussion is beyond the scope of this current Article. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon,
Like a Fish Needs a Bicycle: Public Corporations and Their Shareholders, 65 MD. L. REV. 538,
542 (2006) (explaining that, under options theory, “once a firm has issued debt,
debtholders and holders of equity both share contingent control and bear residual
risk”); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789,
804–05 (2007) (discussing the team production model of corporate governance and
noting that “while shareholders may share in the wealth when the corporation does
well and suffer when the firm does poorly, so may employees, creditors, and other
stakeholders”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 336 (2007) (arguing that zone
of insolvency only applies in cases where the business judgment rule does not apply,
shareholder and creditor interests conflict, and recovery goes directly to those with
standing); Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (2007) (arguing that the corporate duty to creditors doctrine should be abolished and imposing a duty arising only upon a formal
bankruptcy proceeding); Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate
Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809 (2008) (proposing an approach called
contract primacy as the default credit rule).
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interests, then control may be exercised either impartially or with partiality to one interest or another. If the policymaker recognizes both
interests as worthy of protection, then its policy requires neutrality in
the default manager.”172 Although the case facilitator would not
assume control of a Chapter 11 case, she would provide a neutral perspective to the parties that is absent in the existing process. Moreover,
as discussed below, the case facilitator’s ability to convey information
to the court, including information concerning obstructionist or selfdealing behavior, would help her play a meaningful role in case
resolution.173
A. The Basic Elements of the Proposal
The appointment of a case facilitator would be mandatory in
every Chapter 11 case, unless the court for cause waived the requirement.174 The court would make the appointment from a panel of
qualified third-party neutrals as soon as possible after the filing of the
Chapter 11 petition. The debtor and other parties in interest could
request a particular third-party neutral from the panel, but the ultimate decision would rest with the court.175 The qualifications for the
third-party neutral panel are discussed below.176
172 Westbrook, supra note 17, at 825. Professor Westbrook acknowledges that
exceptions may exist to the need for neutrality in a particular case, such as where the
senior secured lender is significantly undersecured. The case facilitator proposal
accounts for these scenarios by giving the bankruptcy court discretion to waive the
appointment of a case facilitator. See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the
Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L.
REV. 155, 159 (1989) (discussing tensions among claimants’ interests in Chapter 11
and observing that “the objective of the collective is never entirely congruent with the
objective of any of the constituent parts”); infra Part V.A. The case facilitator proposal also may ameliorate concerns regarding the redistributive effects of collectivism in
certain circumstances, including redistributions motivated by “errors and misperceptions owing to imperfections in legal rules; . . . strategic manipulation of the bankruptcy process; . . . [and] contribution among creditors to reduce ‘eve of bankruptcy’
conflicts of interest.” Jackson & Scott, supra, at 163.
173 See infra Part V.A.2.
174 For example, the court’s discretion in the appointment of a case facilitator
would allow it to waive the appointment in small business cases, where the circumstances may not warrant an appointment.
175 The proposal does not support the election of the case facilitator by creditors,
as can be done in the Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 trustee context, because the case
facilitator is intended to be an independent representative of the court. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 702 (2006) (election of Chapter 7 trustee); id. § 1104(b)(1) (election of Chapter 11
trustee).
176 See infra Part V.B.
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1. The Case Facilitator’s Primary Objectives
Upon her appointment, the case facilitator’s primary objectives
would be to facilitate (i) the collection and sharing of information
among the bankruptcy court, the debtor and the stakeholders; and
(ii) negotiations among the parties regarding the debtor’s reorganization or other appropriate resolution to the case. Accordingly, the case
facilitator’s first task would be reviewing the debtor’s books and
records, the events leading to the Chapter 11 case and the debtor’s
overall financial position.177 The case facilitator would submit a factual accounting to the court and stakeholders based on this review,178
and she would be obligated to update this report on a periodic basis,
providing the court with information regarding the debtor’s progress,
potential issues and reorganization timeline.179
In addition to submitting factual reports, the case facilitator
would be required to communicate with the key parties in the Chapter 11 case. The case facilitator should be in constant dialogue with
the debtor and establish appropriate contact with representatives of
the debtor’s major stakeholder groups. The latter would include any
official committee, as well as any ad hoc committees that are active in
the case.180 In fact, the case facilitator model may reduce litigation
regarding official committee composition and requests for the

177 The case facilitator’s investigation powers would be similar to those of a Chapter 11 trustee or examiner. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (describing powers of trustee and
examiner).
178 For example, the case facilitator could be required to submit its preliminary
report within sixty days of the commencement of the case. This general timeframe
would allow the case facilitator sufficient time to perform discovery and review of the
debtor’s books and records, yet present the report early enough so that the court and
the parties can start to develop a meaningful exit strategy for the debtor. In addition,
this timeframe could be expedited in a prepackaged Chapter 11 case. See infra Part
V.C.
179 In general, quarterly reports likely would suffice, but this timeframe could be
altered by the court on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the court could entertain
requests to seal the reports, at least on a temporary basis, on a case-by-case basis to the
extent that the reports contain sensitive, confidential or proprietary information.
Although the Bankruptcy Code encourages full disclosure of all relevant information,
the court may determine that information concerning potential claims, settlement
negotiations and similar matters should be protected until an appropriate resolution
of the matter is reached among the affected parties.
180 See Bo J. Howell, Hedge Funds: A New Dimension in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 7
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 35, 46–51 (2008) (discussing participation of ad hoc committees in Chapter 11 cases).
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appointment of additional official committees.181 The case facilitator
would be a contact point for all stakeholders.
2. The Case Facilitator’s Role
The case facilitator would use her meetings with the debtor and
stakeholders to gather and share information and assist the parties in
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions,
the potential risks and costs associated with those positions, and other
factors influencing the debtor’s case. The debtor still would be the
primary party responsible for developing and proposing a plan of
reorganization.182 The case facilitator would act primarily in its
named role: reviewing the proposed plan options and working with
the parties to help them identify the best option.183
Notably, the case facilitator would not independently assess or
make recommendations to the bankruptcy court regarding the parties’ positions or the debtor’s reorganization options. This distinction
is important to preserve the case facilitator’s independence and avoid
181 See, e.g., Kenneth N. Klee & K. John Shaffer, Creditors’ Committee Under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 44 S.C. L. REV. 995, 1024–25 (1993) (“On the other hand,
multiple committees can complicate negotiations, delay the reorganization process,
and create additional administrative expenses to the debtor’s estate, particularly in
terms of higher professional fees.”); Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C.
L. REV. 791, 840 (1993) (“Within the creditor ranks, courts also can resist the temptation to appoint multiple committees. The savings would be in fees and in reducing
bargaining costs.” (footnote omitted)); see also Gwynne, supra note 15, at 134
(explaining use of multiple committees and noting that “[o]ne of the main factors in
decisions refusing to order the appointment of an additional committee is the
expense associated with the additional committee, including the fees that would be
incurred by the estate to pay for the committee’s professionals”).
182 The case facilitator proposal does not contemplate reducing the debtor’s
exclusive periods to file and solicit acceptances of a plan of reorganization. See 11
U.S.C. § 1121 (providing the debtor with an initial 120 days to file, and 180 days to
solicit acceptances of, a plan of reorganization).
183 A “plan facilitator” concept was included in the recommendations of the Select
Advisory Committee on Business Reorganizations (SABRE). See Karen M. GebbiaPinetti, First Report of the Select Advisory Committee on Business Reorganization, 57 BUS.
LAW. 163, 167 (2001) (“Proposal 2 is designed to employ a neutral facilitator to foster
consensus and break through impasse if the parties are unable to agree on the essential structure of a plan within a reasonable period.”). The case facilitator’s role in the
plan process would be similar to the plan facilitator contemplated by SABRE’s proposal, including in its functions to bring the parties to the negotiating table and make
recommendations to the court regarding the debtor’s restructuring options. See id.
The case facilitator proposal would differ significantly, however, by introducing the
neutral third party at the inception of the case and requiring that party to review and
report on not only the circumstances surrounding the debtor’s financial demise, but
also the parties’ disputes, progress, and related issues during the Chapter 11 case.
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conflicts that might arise if she is asked to perform both judgmental
and facilitative functions.184 Although this type of hybrid role may be
desirable in some cases, it would be the exception rather than the
rule. As discussed below, this distinction also places the role of the
case facilitator outside of that traditionally reserved for a trustee or
examiner.
The limited role of the case facilitator in evaluating and recommending courses of action would not restrict the case facilitator’s ability to signal information to the bankruptcy court and stakeholders.
The case facilitator would necessarily evaluate the facts of the case in
drafting her written reports for the court. The case facilitator’s ability
to send a negative signal to the court regarding a particular party or
the process generally would encourage parties to cooperate more fully
with the case facilitator.
The case facilitator would have the discretion to pursue her
facilitator role in an informal or more formal mediation setting.185
For example, if the parties are not cooperating as fully or timely as
necessary, the case facilitator may elect to treat the matter as a formal
mediation, requiring the affected parties to submit position statements.186 These statements would identify the particular party’s position, support for that position, suggestions for additional discovery,
and the party’s representative with authority to act on the party’s
184 See, e.g., Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 941 (1997) (discussing potential issues with a mediator serving
both an evaluative and a facilitative function). The Article uses the term “judgmental” in lieu of “evaluative” in discussing the potential conflicts for a mediator in the
bankruptcy context because any successful mediation in Chapter 11 will require the
neutral to evaluate the merits and use her evaluative skills in fostering a consensus.
Nevertheless, the Article does not contemplate an advisory role for the case facilitator
in order to encourage more disclosure by the parties and mitigate concerns about
adverse consequences from those disclosures. As discussed in Part V.E, this aspect of
the case facilitator role distinguishes it from a trustee and examiner.
185 See discussion infra Part V.D; see also Robert E. Wells, Jr., Alternative Dispute
Resolution—What Is It? Where Is It Now?, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 651, 652 (2004) (exploring
status of alternative dispute resolution and describing alternative dispute resolution as
“a large umbrella that encompasses numerous alternatives to litigation and contains
too many permeations to fully enumerate”). According to Wells:
A sterile definition of mediation would read as follows: Mediation is a nonadversarial, non-binding and cooperative process for privately resolving disputes with the assistance of a trained, neutral third-party whose role is to
promote communication between the parties to the dispute and to assist in
the negotiation of the terms of resolution of that dispute.
Id.
186 See, e.g., ARIZ. LOCAL R. BANKR. P. 9072-8 (describing steps for formal mediation of dispute in bankruptcy case).
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behalf.187 The parties’ representatives then would be required to
attend one or more mediation conferences.188 A failed mediation
may require the court’s intervention either to resolve the matter or,
perhaps, to entertain motions to convert or dismiss the case or
appoint a Chapter 11 trustee.
3. The Case Facilitator’s Compensation
The case facilitator would be paid for her services from the bankruptcy estate and should be permitted to retain professionals to assist
in performing her duties.189 The terms governing case facilitator
compensation and professional retention could be similar to those
applicable to panel bankruptcy trustees.190 For example, the compensation paid to the case facilitator could be tied to the value of the
debtor’s assets, and her ability to retain professionals and incur other
expenses could be limited by the court based on the size and complexity of the case.191 This type of scaled, flat-rate compensation scheme
would help control costs. And like panel trustees, a case facilitator
should be subject to removal for cause upon the request of the debtor
or a party in interest or sua sponte by the court.192
B. The Third-Party Neutral Panel
The case facilitator proposal requires effective third-party neutrals. Effective third-party neutrals in turn need to be qualified and
free from conflicts of interest. Accordingly, uniform standards should
187 See, e.g., id. R. 9072-8(c) (stating “[n]ot less than seven days before the ADR
Conference, each party shall submit directly to the mediator, and shall serve on all
counsel and pro se parties, an ADR statement” and setting forth requirements for
such submission).
188 See, e.g., id. R. 9072-8(d) (setting forth persons required to attend mediation
conference).
189 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 327–328, 330–331 (2006) (describing a bankruptcy trustee’s
ability to retain professionals and those professionals’ ability to seek compensation).
190 See id. § 326 (detailing compensation of bankruptcy trustees, which is tied in
part to the amount of distributions to stakeholders); id. § 327 (authorizing bankruptcy trustees to retain professionals).
191 The Article suggests linking the case facilitator’s compensation to the value of
the debtor’s assets (or alternatively the debtor’s gross sales or revenues) rather than
stakeholder distributions to avoid impairing the case facilitator’s neutrality in the process. See supra Part V.
192 See 11 U.S.C. § 324 (providing for the removal of bankruptcy trustees); see also
ARIZ. LOCAL R. BANKR. P. 9072-7(c) (setting forth circumstances that disqualify a
mediator from service).
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govern the third-party neutral panels established in each
jurisdiction.193
The standards could follow those applicable to mediator panels
under alternative dispute resolution programs. For example, licensed
attorneys who practice in the bankruptcy field could apply to serve as
a case facilitator. The applicant would be required to, among other
things, certify that she is in good standing with the bar, has completed
appropriate mediation training, and is willing to serve as a courtappointed case facilitator in at least one Chapter 11 case per year.194
The third-party neutral panel could be an extension of the jurisdiction’s existing panel of bankruptcy trustees.
Panel applicants also should understand that, when serving as
case facilitators, they are an officer of the court, but they are not an
advocate for any particular party in the Chapter 11 case. Panel applicants could be required to take an oath to that effect or certify their
193 For example, the Bankruptcy Code provides uniform standards that govern the
eligibility of a person to serve as a bankruptcy trustee. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 321–322.
194 For example, the alternative dispute resolution procedure adopted by the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona sets the following criteria
for mediators:
(1) if the applicant is an attorney, be a member in good standing of the bar
of any state or the District of Columbia, with at least five years of practice; or
(2) if the applicant is an attorney, be a member in good standing of the bar
of the Federal District Court of Arizona, with at least five years of practice; or
(3) if the applicant is a panel trustee, be an active panel trustee in good
standing with the office of the United States Trustee with at least five years of
service as a panel trustee, or if retired, have been a panel trustee in good
standing with the office of the United States Trustee with at least five years of
service as a panel trustee;
(4) not have been suspended, or have had a professional license or bond
revoked, or have pending any proceeding to suspend or revoke such license
or bond;
(5) not have resigned from a professional organization or panel while an
investigation was pending into allegations of misconduct which would warrant suspension, disbarment or professional license or bond revocation;
(6) not have been convicted of a felony;
(7) have completed appropriate mediation training, or have sufficient experience, in the mediation process;
(8) be determined by the court to be competent to perform the duties of a
mediator; and
(9) be willing to serve as mediator in at least one matter during each quarter
of each year, subject only to unavailability due to conflicts, personal or professional commitments, or other matters which would make such service
inappropriate.
ARIZ. LOCAL R. BANKR. P. 9072-6.
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commitment to that charge on a periodic basis.195 Any panel applicant who deviates from this basic principle should be removed from
the panel and subjected to appropriate sanctions by the presiding
court.
Once placed on the third-party neutral panel, panelists should be
required to submit periodic disclosures to the court or the U.S. trustee regarding their active bankruptcy representations.196 This disclosure will assist the court and the U.S. trustee in monitoring potential
conflicts of interests. Moreover, if a panelist is approached to act as
the case facilitator in a Chapter 11 case, she should be required to
disclose immediately any actual or potential conflicts or relationships
in the case. The case facilitator must be completely disinterested and
free from conflict in any assigned case.
C. Case Facilitator and Prepackaged Bankruptcies
The Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to solicit acceptances of a
plan of reorganization prior to filing a Chapter 11 case.197 This process commonly is called a prepackaged Chapter 11 case, and it typically results in a quick reorganization. Prepackaged Chapter 11 cases
can be completed in as few as sixty days, provided there are no complications in the confirmation process.198
The case facilitator proposal does not undercut the value of
prepackaged Chapter 11 cases. In fact, it may enhance that process
and make it a more viable option for distressed companies. For example, the court could waive the case facilitator requirement in a
prepackaged case. Alternatively, the debtor and its stakeholders could
approach a member of its jurisdiction’s third-party neutral panel prior
to filing any case and seek her assistance in negotiating the prepackaged plan.199 Debtors in the United Kingdom have invoked this type
195 See id. R. 9072-6(e) (setting forth an oath for mediators).
196 A case facilitator should be a “disinterested person,” as such term is defined
under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (defining “disinterested person”
to mean, among other things, that the person “is not a creditor, an equity security
holder, or an insider” of the debtor).
197 See id. § 1126(b) (permitting prepetition solicitation of plan of reorganization
under certain circumstances).
198 See generally Conrad B. Duberstein, Out-of-Court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 347, 365 (1993) (“Since the prepackaged plan is negotiated before the Chapter 11
case starts, it can take advantage of all the benefits available under the Code without
the detriments of a prolonged and expensive proceeding . . . .” (quoting Marc S.
Kirschner et al., Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans: The Deleveraging Tool of the ‘90s in the
Wake of OID and Tax Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 643, 663 (1991))).
199 See supra Part V.B.
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of pre-filing involvement by a third party (i.e., the administrator) with
some success.200 A third-party neutral may even help the parties reach
an out-of-court workout and avoid a Chapter 11 filing altogether. A
third-party neutral would need to conduct any prepetition activities
carefully and mindful of her duties as a potential case facilitator in the
matter.
D. Value of the Case Facilitator Proposal
As a descriptive matter, the case facilitator proposal adds significant value to the Chapter 11 process. It provides the court with objective and timely status reports, which will help courts make more
informed decisions. It provides an automatic investigation mechanism to uncover wrongful or illegal conduct that might have contributed to the debtor’s financial distress. It allows more stakeholders to
have a seat at the negotiating table by identifying a neutral court official to seek out, hear, and consider stakeholder concerns regarding
the case. Finally, it enhances the alternative dispute resolution aspects
of bankruptcy by introducing a trained mediator into the plan negotiating process.
As a practical matter, parties and critics likely will highlight the
additional administrative layer added to the Chapter 11 process by the
case facilitator proposal.201 The proposal does add another party to
the Chapter 11 process and imposes additional fees and expenses on
the bankruptcy estate. The primary objectives of the proposal are,
however, to streamline the process and improve communication,
thereby fostering quicker reorganizations and less litigation. These
objectives have the potential to reduce the overall cost of Chapter 11
cases and add value that offsets any expenses associated with the case
facilitator’s appointment.202
200 See supra Part IV.C.
201 Chapter 11 cases are already extremely expensive, and the bankruptcy estate
bears the overwhelming burden of these administrative costs. See STEPHEN J. LUBBEN,
AM. BANKR. INST., CHAPTER 11 PROFESSIONAL FEE STUDY (2007) (extensive study of
professional fees in Chapter 11 cases); see also 11 U.S.C. § 328 (providing that professionals retained by debtors, trustees and committees may be compensated by the
bankruptcy estate).
202 See supra Part V.A; see also Flaschen, supra note 138, at 515 (“[A]n effective
monitor could well reduce expenses in a case by substantially reducing the parties’
resort to expensive and wasteful adversarial litigation to resolve matters that would be
addressed on a constructive basis in consideration of the independent appointee’s
recommendations.”).
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1. Using Mediation to Control Costs
Although not specifically contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code,
courts have used techniques similar to mediation and plan facilitators
in Chapter 11 cases.203 Courts typically make these appointments pursuant to their inherent authority to manage their dockets, their limited equitable powers under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, and
various rules encouraging alternative dispute resolution in the federal
courts.204 Some courts also allow the parties in bankruptcy cases to
request mediation through their local bankruptcy rules.205
Courts typically invoke a mediation technique, either sua sponte
or at the request of a party in interest, in cases where the parties have
reached an impasse. For example, in the Chapter 11 cases of In re
R.H. Macy & Co.,206 the court appointed a third-party mediator after
the debtor failed to propose a confirmable plan during the first two
years of the case.207 The court apparently was concerned that ongoing plan negotiations among the parties, without the intervention of
an objective third party, would result in litigation and additional delay
and expense.208 Notably, the parties reached consensus on a plan of
reorganization “[w]ithin approximately five months of the appointment of the mediator.”209
Courts also have used mediation techniques to resolve claims
against the debtor, including in the In re Lehman Brothers Holdings
203 See ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MEDIATION IN BANKRUPTCY (1998),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bankrmed.pdf/$file/
bankrmed.pdf (reporting results of survey regarding mediation practices in bankruptcy); Newsome, supra note 124, at 977–79 (discussing the increasing use of “case
management and alternative dispute resolution . . . in the bankruptcy courts”); see also
J. Thomas Corbett, Mediation, Bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Administrator, 65 ALA. LAW.
410, 413 (2004) (describing use of mediation in bankruptcy cases); Gebbia-Pinetti,
supra note 183, at 188–91 nn.41–47 (explaining use of mediation and alternative dispute resolution procedures in bankruptcy).
204 See Corbett, supra note 203, at 411–13.
205 ARIZ. LOCAL R. BANKR. P. 9072-1 (setting forth bankruptcy alternative dispute
resolution program).
206 Ch. 11 No. 93 Civ. 4414, 1994 WL 482948 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1994).
207 Id.; see also In re Eagle Picher Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 48, 1998 WL 939869, at *2
(6th Cir. Dec. 21, 1998) (unpublished table decision) (using mediator to facilitate
plan negotiations).
208 See Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69
AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 437 (1995); Cassandra G. Mott, Macy’s Miracle on 34th Street:
Employing Mediation to Develop the Reorganization Plan in a Mega-Chapter 11 Case, 14 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 193, 207–10 (1998).
209 Corbett, supra note 203, at 412.
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Inc.210 Chapter 11 case and in the asbestos context.211 These claims
resolution facilities generally have enabled the bankruptcy estate to
resolve a large number of claims on an expedited basis and at a costsavings to the estate.212 Although mediators do not always produce
consensual or estate-maximizing resolutions, anecdotal evidence suggests that the potential benefits outweigh any potential burdens
imposed by the additional administrative procedures.
2. Response to Potential Increased Costs
The case facilitator proposal seeks to draw on prior uses of mediation in bankruptcy and integrate mediation techniques into Chapter
11. The proposal would introduce mediation at the commencement
of the case, and parties would expect and understand this element of
the process. Consequently, Chapter 11 cases would not linger uncertainly for years before the court or an interested party introduced
mediation concepts.
Overall, the case facilitator proposal has the potential to reduce
rather than increase costs. The integration of mediation early in the
Chapter 11 process could have substantial operational and cost-saving
benefits for the debtor and the bankruptcy estate. In addition, as discussed in Part V.A.3, linking the case facilitator’s compensation to
asset value and limiting her expenditures would help ensure that costs
correspond to the size and complexity of the Chapter 11 case.
E. The Case Facilitator Versus the Chapter 11 Trustee/Examiner
Another potential critique of the case facilitator proposal is that
the Bankruptcy Code already contemplates the appointment of a trustee if the parties act in bad faith or, in extreme circumstances, cannot
210 Ch. 11 Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.NY.).
211 See Corbett, supra note 203, at 412 (explaining use of mediation to resolve
claims disputes); Erin Marie Daly, Mediation Ordered in Lehman Derivatives Feud,
LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.law360.com/print_article/118654 (last visited
Nov. 12, 2010) (“Judge James Peck of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York agreed with Lehman Wednesday that compulsory mediation
would reduce the number of disputes over the contracts . . . .”); see also A.H. Robins
Co. v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 164 F.3d 623, 1998 WL 726754, at *1 (4th Cir.
Oct. 16, 1998) (unpublished table decision) (explaining alternative dispute resolution procedures used to address products liability claims).
212 See Corbett, supra note 203, at 412 (“The claims resolution facility established
in the Greyhound case resulted in 95 percent of more than 3,200 pre-petition tort
claims being resolved through ADR.”).
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reach a consensus on a reorganization plan.213 Alternatively, parties
can request the appointment of an examiner to investigate the
debtor’s or other parties’ conduct. In theory, courts simply could
invoke these remedies more frequently. In practice, this expanded
use of existing remedies—particularly Chapter 11 trustees—would
meet intense resistance and would not enhance the communication
and negotiation that are necessary to resolve Chapter 11 cases in an
expeditious and cost-effective manner.
A Chapter 11 trustee, even when appointed with limited powers,
is viewed as stripping the debtor of any meaningful say in the reorganization process and almost ensuring a sale or liquidation of the
debtor’s business.214 Whether or not this perception is accurate, it
permeates corporate America and much of the bankruptcy bar. This
perception may relate to the history of Chapter 11, specifically Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.215 Even if the role of the Chapter 11
trustee were changed substantively under the Bankruptcy Code, psychological barriers likely would prevent its successful
implementation.216
More importantly, the case facilitator is significantly different in
scope and purpose than a traditional bankruptcy trustee or examiner.217 The appointment of a trustee or examiner involves fingerpointing and suggestions of misconduct; the appointment of a case
213 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006) (grounds for appointing Chapter 11 trustee);
Alces, supra note 87, at 136–37 (“The trustee remedy is specifically provided by the
Code when the bankruptcy court or party in interest believes that the debtor’s management has engaged in ‘fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement
of the affairs of the debtor.’ ” (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a))); see also discussion supra
Part II.B.3.
214 See, e.g., Clifford J. White III & Walter W. Theus, Jr., Chapter 11 Trustees and
Examiners After BAPCPA, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289, 316 (2006) (explaining history to,
and current status of, Chapter 11 trustees and observing that “[t]he distaste for chapter 11 trustee appointments shown by many bankruptcy courts early in the development of the case law under the Code was perhaps to be expected, given their
experience in presiding over chapter XI cases under the Bankruptcy Act”); see also
Alces, supra note 87, at 137 (discussing the flexibility in trustee appointments and the
use of trustees with limited powers).
215 See Warren, supra note 20, at 371–73 (explaining the importance of perception
in the utility of bankruptcy laws and noting that “[o]ne of the key reasons for the
adoption of the 1978 Code was the widespread perception that the old Code was
unworkable”).
216 See discussion supra Part II.B; see also Warren, supra note 20, at 371 (“In order
to stimulate the debtor to initiate bankruptcy proceedings at an appropriate point
when the business risks economic failure, there must be some incentive to attract the
business into the bankruptcy process.”).
217 See supra Part V.A.2.
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facilitator would not.218 The case facilitator would not have authority
to take control of the debtor’s business or the Chapter 11 case. She
likewise would not have authority to extinguish creditors’ claims, convert the case to a liquidation or recommend a course of action to the
court. Rather, her primary focus would be facilitating communication
and negotiation among the parties. Consequently, the case facilitator
should not be viewed as a threat to the autonomy of the DIP or any
other party in the Chapter 11 case.
In addition, cases still may warrant the appointment of a traditional Chapter 11 trustee.219 The case facilitator’s reports may reveal
facts supporting the appointment of a trustee or the pursuit of claims
against certain parties. The case facilitator would not recommend or
pursue those actions, but she may provide relevant information to the
court and stakeholders. In that respect, the case facilitator may provide sufficient information to the parties that may eliminate the need
for any examiner.220
F. Fostering the Dual Goals of Chapter 11
The goals of Chapter 11 generally are defined as rehabilitating
the debtor and maximizing returns to creditors.221 The case
facilitator proposal would help courts and debtors achieve these dual
goals. As discussed above, it would introduce an objective third party
into the process at an early stage, providing all parties with more information and in turn a greater ability to assess the debtor’s restructuring
options.222 This attribute alone may help avoid prolonged disputes
about the basic question of whether the debtor should reorganize or
liquidate.
218 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
219 The case facilitator’s meaningful service to the court will turn, in part, on her
receiving accurate and complete information from all parties. That type of full disclosure likely will not occur if information provided to the case facilitator might be used
against the party by the case facilitator in a subsequent trustee role. See discussion
supra Part V.A; see also 11 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2006) (“A person that has served as an
examiner in the case may not serve as trustee in the case.”).
220 Although the case facilitator would not judge the parties’ conduct as often
done by an examiner, other parties in the Chapter 11 case could perform that function with the information provided by the case facilitator. Consequently, the case
facilitator proposal could eliminate the additional cost associated with a separate
examiner but continue the benefits realized in cases from the appointment of examiners. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 336 B.R. 610 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(reviewing the use of examiners in several large, complex Chapter 11 cases).
221 See supra Part I.
222 See supra Part V.A.
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Moreover, the proposal’s focus on conflict resolution may preserve value for the estate. Conflicts and competing restructuring
plans among the debtor and the stakeholders can cost the estate millions; money otherwise available for investment in the debtor’s operations or payments to creditors.223 Either use would better serve the
underlying goals of Chapter 11. In sum, the case facilitator proposal
seeks to provide the court, the debtor, and the stakeholders with
much-needed information and a dispute resolution framework to foster the parties’ opportunities for success.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 11 and the U.S. DIP model are important tools for distressed corporations. They offer a debtor the ability to reassess its
operational structure and financial obligations in a relatively safe and
stable environment, at least at the outset of the case. This environment can change quickly on a debtor, however, under internal pressures from the board or management or, more likely, external
pressures from key stakeholders. The Chapter 11 process and debtors
could benefit from an objective reporting and mediation tool—i.e., a
case facilitator.
The case facilitator proposal is based on a third-party neutral platform and would not displace the traditional role of DIPs or stifle the
voice of stakeholders in the process.224 Rather, it would place an
objective party at the negotiation table to enhance communication
among the parties themselves and the court, and it would integrate
mediation techniques into the process to facilitate quicker and less
litigious resolutions.225 The case facilitator proposal would not eliminate all conflict in Chapter 11 cases. It would, however, better balance
and mitigate competing interests in the case and better equip the
court to evaluate any unresolved conflict.
Accordingly, as courts and policymakers consider the utility of
Chapter 11, they should consider implementing the case facilitator
proposal. Courts arguably could invoke this technique on a case-bycase basis under existing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, but it
would be a more effective mechanism if adopted on a uniform basis as
part of the Bankruptcy Code itself.226 The early intervention of a
third-party neutral into the reorganization process could save critical
time and money and, consequently, the debtors themselves.
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